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POLITICAL INTEGRATION:
A NATIONAL
LANGUAGE FOR MALAYSIA

Zairina Othman, M.A.
Western Michigan University,

1984

This study investigates the need of a national language policy
to promote political integration in a new nation, using Malaysia as
an example.

The thesis attempts to explain why Bahasa Malaysia was

chosen as the national language and how its implementation as the
prime language of political, social, and economic communication has
contributed towards national political unity and stability in
Malaysia.

Three propositions are presented and investigated in sup

port of the thesis.
The first proposition suggests that an acceptable national lan
guage helps foster political integration in a culturally pluralistic
society.

The primary objective would be to replace a specific ethno

cultural orientation with a consciousness of the expanded nation.
The second proposition suggests that the most appropriate choice
of a national language for Malaysia is the Malay language (Bahasa
Malaysia).
The third proposition attempts to demonstrate that the use of
Bahasa Malaysia contributes to political stability, and thereby pro
motes national unity.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Ethno-cultural divisions and the use of a national language
policy to remedy them are complicated by a number of specifically
Malaysian considerations.
At Malayan independence in 1957, British colonial rule left
behind an arguably historically valid Malay nation-state which,
however, had implanted on Malaysia large immigrant communities,
making up half the population of the country.

These "immigrants,"

about 80% Chinese and 20% Indian origin, were not only ethnically and
culturally but also economically and socially separate from the Malay
indigenes.

The vast majority of the Malays lived a neo-feudal rural

existence while the majority of the immigrants operated in an urban
or rural (mainly plantation agriculture) modern capitalist economy.
The political set-up of the new state reflected the socio
economic relations in and between the principal ethno-cultural
groups.

Each major ethno-cultural group formed a political party and

the elite of each party claimed to represent the whole ethnic group
they belonged to.

The socioeconomic makeup of the society' and the

colonial separation of educational and other facilities of social
integration assured little support for non-ethnic-based parties.

1
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A British trained largely aristocratic Malay elite formed a
government in alliance with representatives of elites from both of
the major immigrant groups.

Initially the Malay elite, by stressing

ethnic and religious unity, also ruled with the tacit support of the
rural Malay masses.

Indeed the attentions of both the Malay and

immigrant masses were diverted from perhaps more worthy aspirations
and certainly from interethnic class unity by stress on ethno
cultural divisions and competition which were clearly (and perhaps
deliberately) reflected in the communal based parties of the ruling
alliance.

As these ethno-cultural cleavages deepened and eventually

led to ethnic violence in 1969, the elite was forced to recognize and
take seriously the necessity for some degree of both economic devel
opment for the Malay masses and at least apparent ethnic integration
to prevent the destruction of the nation they were so profitably
ruling.
It is to the second of these necessities, the need for some
degree of national integration,

that this thesis addresses itself.

The problem was to promote national unity while not upsetting the
delicate political balance between the Malay ruling elite and the
other major ethnic elites on the one hand, and between the Malay
ruling elite and the rural Malay masses on the other.
A solution w M c h allowed the continuation of ethnically based
political identification was to gradually break down ethno-linguistic
identification and replace it with national-linguistic identification
by implementing a strong national language policy.

However, if the

Malay rural masses were to accept the national language, it could not

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

be a neutral elite language such as English because it would be seen
to be promoting only the elite interests.
One suggestion, already demanded by nationalist Malays and
originally set into motion by "pro-Malay" British administrators, was
to promote and implement the use of a standardized and elaborated
form of the Malay language as the sole language of public usage.
This paper will trace the selection and implementation of Bahasa
Malaysia as the national language and prime means of public c o mmuni
cation in Malaysia and place its selection and implementation in the
political and linguistic contexts of national integration and unity,
and in the specifically Malaysian ethnic, cultural, political, and
socioeconomic environment.

Theoretical and Practical Delineations and Definitions

The theoretical scope of this thesis is multidisciplinary, but
ranges primarily over the intercession between political science,
sociology, and linguistics.

More specifically, it deals with con

cepts of language and political and social integration in the con
texts of nationalism, nation-building, national unity, culture, and
ethnicity.

These superstructural elements, however, must be seen in

the socioeconomic and historical conditions that gave birth to them.
Thus language here is more than just a means of communication.
Language is learned from the society one is born into and lives in.
The particular language one learns as a mother tongue is itself a
product of the history of the society that uses it.

One uses lan

guage to interpret the world and the particular language one uses,
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and the extent of one's capacity to use it, guides and limits one's
interpretation of the world.

The process of adapting to a new lan

guage to the extent of using it for almost all economic, political,
and social communication is, therefore, infinitely more complex than
learning phonetic,

lexical,

structural, and idiomatic patterns.

The

motivation to assimilate oneself into a n e w language has to be at
least as strong as the motivation to continue using one's mother
tongue.

It is suggested that access or restriction to economic or

political participation in the society one lives in is powerful
enough motivation.
In this study political integration requires the willing inclu
sion of representatives of all ethno-cultural and socioeconomic
groups in the process of making authoritative decisions for a
society.

Political participation in a polity is indicative of

political integration.

Rejection of the political system is indica

tive of alienation from it.
Social integration involves the willing inclusion of individuals
or groups in a society.

It includes a desire on the part of the

individual or group to be a part of the society and an acceptance on
the part of the society of the individual or group as members of that
society.

Participation in the society by individuals or. groups

indicates integration while rejection indicates alienation from it.
The focus of this thesis will be on nationalism as distinct from
nation-building and national unity.

For the purposes of this thesis

the term nationalism is an ideological tool used for promoting ethno
cultural solidarity.

It takes the form of internal cohesion versus
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external threat and thus can be viewed as a vertical bond in society
which can be used to cut across socioeconomic divisions within a
single ethno-cultural group.

It comprises "the more inclusive orga

nization and the elaborated beliefs, values and behaviors which
nationalities develop on behalf of their avowed ethnocultural selfi n t e r e s t " (Fishman, 1972b, p. 4).
It does not comprise "nationalities" (i.e.,

ethno-cultural

groups) which may also live in the same "country" or nation-state but
are not members of the ethno-cultural group originally being de
scribed .
Nation-building and national unity are similar in as much as
that they bring together diverse ethno-cultural groups.

Nation-

building is state use of the coercive and ideological apparatus
(police, military,

education, mass media, language, etc.) to weld

together different ethno-cultural groups into one nation-state.
National unity is not so coercive and aims at integration.

The

state manipulates the ideological symbols and apparatus to integrate
diverse groups, both ethno-cultural and socioeconomic,

into a united

whole.
Culture, for the purposes of this study, constitutes the accumu
lated beliefs (including religion),

ideas,

and values of a social

group and the means it uses to express these, mainly through arts,
institutions,

and language.

Ethnicity is used-in this thesis as a more precise term than
race yet narrower than nationality.

Race can be confusing because of

its biological connotations which, in the case of Malaysia, would

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6
include Malays with Ibans or Senoi, but not with Tamils or Negritos.
Nationality would be confusing in the Malaysian context because it
would not differentiate between the diverse ethnic groups who com
prise Malaysians.
Races of Malaysia are referred to as ethno-cultural groups in
this thesis because, unlike some diverse ethnic groups in some parts
of the world (e.g., many Americans),

the ethnic groups in Malaysia

are culturally very differentiated as well.
This thesis concentrates on the political ramifications of the
national language policy in Peninsular Malaysia only.

Although the

East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak are mentioned peripher
ally,

they are not comprehensively covered for several reasons.

Firstly,

there is simply less material available on the East

Malaysian states.

Secondly, what statistics and research that are

available are rarely included in the general statistics and research
on Malaysia as a whole (See for example F ourth Malaysia Pla n , 1980).
Thirdly, the political setup has been very different to that of West
Malaysia, notably in having a predominance of non-communally-basea
parties (although this pattern is currently changing in Sarawak with
the growth of a Dayak-only party).

Fourthly, the Malay and Muslim

presence in East Malaysia is weak, whereas in the peninsular it is
all-pervasive.

Finally, Sabah and Sarawak were allowed to follow

separate language policies to the peninsular until recently.

As a

result the full effects of the national language policy are yet to be
felt in the eastern states.
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Research Methods

The research for this thesis was based largely on secondary
library sources, such as books,

journals, periodicals, newspapers,

and on Malaysian Government publications.

Statistical data has been

gathered from the above, especially the Fourth Five-Years Malaysian
Flan.
The research necessary to find out the extent of success or
failure achieved in promoting national integration through the
national language policy was carried out by comparing conditions
relating to ethno-cultural integration apropos of language pre- and
post-1969.

The year 1969 was chosen as the watershed from which to

measure ethno-cultural integration because of the bloody ethnic riot
ing which occurred in May of that year and which prompted a rapid
increase in state intervention in the promotion of national unity and
the quashing of both ethno-cultural and socioeconomic dissent.
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CHAPTER II

THE THEORETICAL, COMPARATIVE, AND NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT— A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter critically reviews the wide ranging and multi
disciplinary literature on language and nation-building and national
unity and proposes that the selection and implementation of a single
common language of national communication is, under certain circum
stances,

conducive to national integration.

Firstly,

literature on theories on national integration.

it surveys the

Secondly,

it inves

tigates some of the work in print on other attempts at promoting
national unity from a comparative perspective.

Thirdly, it reviews

the literature on Malaysia's attempts at national integration, par
ticularly through the national language policy.

The Theoretical Background

The study of the use of language as a political tool for inte
gration is currently out of favor in political science circles (as a
glance through any recent index to articles on language and national
integration will show).

It is a reflection of that disfavor that the

majority of the literature on the role of language in national inte
gration has been written by researchers with backgrounds essentially
in socio-linguistics rather than political science.

Indeed many

socio-linguists (Cobarrubis & Fishman,

1982; Fishman,

1983; Cooper,

1968) suggest that questions of language policy per se would be

8
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better researched by political scientists.

A multidisciplinary

approach with a substantial contribution from political science would
significantly benefit our understanding of, in the words of a re
searcher with a nonlinguistic background, "individual and subgroup
involvement in the national system" (Kelman, cited in Rubin &
Jernudd,

1971, p. 21).

Fishman, quantitatively and qualitatively by

far the leading scholar in the field, makes the case for the mul t i 
disciplinary approach to language and national integration.
The topics . . . are . . . cl e a r l y l a n g u a g e - r e l a t e d , but
they cannot be studied as such by most socio-linguists
today.
Topics such as these require the close collabora
tion and integration of disciplines that are still too
rarely in serious contact with other. Optimally they
require much more than multidisciplinary research; they
require the preparation of researchers who are themselves
interdisciplinary and therefore '^ho can approach questions
in this area in terms of problem-orientation rather than
in terms of vested disciplinary interests and skills.
(Fishman, 1968, pp. 8-9)
Our multidisciplinary theoretical approach begins with notions
of integration into the "artificially" assembled nation-state.
Deutsch (1966),

Fishman (1972b), and Breuilly (1982), among others,

differentiate between the nation-states that came into being in
Europe in the 19th century (e.g., Germany and Italy) and the "new"
nations of Africa and Asia that have come into being as independent
entities since World War II.
The former became nations out of a desire to unify ethno
cultural groups with the same language into single states.

After the

Napoleonic Wars, European intellectuals recognized that "there were
apparently some nationalities who were such even in the absence of
states

of their own" (Rubin & Jernudd,

1971, p. 7).

These constitute
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Fishman's

(1968) process

of "Nation into

State."

The latter (e.g., India and Nigeria) became nations because the
inhabitants of colonial administrative areas achieved independence.
The geographical boundaries of the new nations did not usually corre
spond with ethno-cultural and linguistic boundaries.

One of the main

tasks of the elites which inherited the apparatus of the colonial
state was to forge unified nations out of the disparate ethno
cultural groups in the new states.

These constitute Fishman's (1968)

process of "State into Nation."
Some recent observers believe that attempts to operate within
geographical boundaries which do not constitute true nation-states
(i.e.,

states which represent one ethno-cultural group only) should

not even be attempted.

These observers reject any form of inte

grative theory as impossible, given disparate ethno-cultural groups
within a polity.
A-

Smith (1983),

Representative of this extreme nationalist view are
Breuilly (1982),

and Connor (1972).

The national

ists claim that liberals and Marxists alike have ignored or under
played the importance of ethnicity.

This excerpt from Connor's

(1972) seminal article best summarizes their position:
The preponderant number of states are multiethnic. Ethnic
consciousness has been definitely increasing, not decreas
ing, in recent years.
No particular classification of
multiethnic states has proven immune to the fissiparous
impact of ethnicity: authoritarian and democratic; fed
erative and unitary; Asian, African, American and European
states have all been afflicted. Form of government and
geography have clearly not been determinative.
Nor has
the level of economic development.
But the accompaniments
of economic development— increased social mobilization and
communication— appear to have increased ethnic tensions
and to be conducive to separatist demands.
Despite all
this, leading theoreticians of "nation-building" have
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tended to ignore or slight the problems associated with
ethnicity, (p. 332)
A. Smith (1983), in particular, emphasizes the growth rather
than decline of ethnicity in his book The Ethnic Revival.
Language, in multiethnic states, can only be divisive, although
it is integrative in true nation-states.

"It is language and/or

culture which divides men, perpetually, in the m o d e m world; and
which,

equally,

constitutes the chief bond between men today” (A.

Smith, 1983, p. 47).
The nationalist approach ignores several realities.

Firstly,

there are many states which are ethnically heterogeneous and yet
which exist as successful polities (e.g.,
Secondly,

the U.S.A.

and Australia).

there are several 3tates which are ethnically, culturally,

and linguistically heterogeneous and yet which function successfully
as nations (e.g.,

Switzerland and Singapore).

Thirdly,

those states

which have, through the whims of colonial or other policy, found
large and diverse ethno-cultural populations within their boundaries
are unlikely to voluntarily "Balkanize" themselves.

Moreover, some

of these states have populations which are so intermingled that they
could not viably geographically separate.

Finally,

the nationalists

ignore the infinitely more powerful pull of socioeconomic over
"primordian" ethnic factors.

(The same criticism will be leveled at

some integrative theoreticians below.)
The mainstream of opinion maintains that the state remains the
most important form of political entity for achieving goals.

It is

through the state that the bulk of developing countries’ development

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
plans are formulated and usually implemented.

These development

plans are likely to be frustrated if there is serious ethno-cultural
or socioeconomic strife.

Development goals would be more easily

attained still if the population had the same language and culture.
For these reasons unification (and the corresponding integration)
rank high in a developing country's agenda.
Integration theorists view nation-building as important,

espe

cially in the developing world, for creating the national unity and
integration required for stability and development.
these forces is explained by Deutsch (1966),

The role of

the leading theoretician

of integration:
The nation-state, it seems, is still the chief political
instrument for getting things done. The main basis of its
power is, n o w more than ever, the consent of the governed;
and this consent is easiest to obtain and to keep among
populations with the same language, culture, and tradi
tions of nationality.
Nation-preserving, nation-building,
and nationalism or the preference for the real or imagined
interests of one's ow n nation and its members— these still
remain a major and even a still growing force in politics,
which statesmen of good will would ignore at their neril.
(P -

4)

Deutsch (1966) argued that "social mobilization" occurs when
modernization leads to improvements in communications and opportuni
ties for employment which uproot people.

Examples of this are

peasantry moving from the countryside to cities to become urban
proletariat and immigrants coming to America.

Social mobilization

then leads to "assimilation” into the larger society (i.e.,
nation),

which constitutes nation-building.

the

"A decisive factor in

national assimilation or differentiation was found to be the process
of social mobilization which accompanies the growth of markets,
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industries, and towns, and eventually of literacy and mass communica
tion" (Deutsch, 1966, p. 188).
Deutsch later became aware that social mobilization might pro
ceed at a pace that would outstrip assimilation and lead to strife.
We have seen that the more gradually the process of social
mobilization moves, the more time there is for social and
national assimilation to work. Conversely, the more
social mobilization is postponed, the more quickly its
various aspects— language, monetization, mass audience,
literacy, voting, urbanization, industrialization— must
eventually be achieved.
But when all of these develop
ments have to be crowded into the lifetime of one or two
generations, the chances for assimilation to work are much
smaller. The likelihood is much greater that people will
be precipitated into politics with their old languages,
their old outlook on the world and their old tribal
loyalties still largely unchanged; and it becomes far more
difficult to have them think of themselves as members of
one of new nation.
It took centuries to make Englishmen
and Frenchmen.
How are variegated tribal groups to become
Tanzanians, Zambians, or Malaysians in one generation?
(Deutsch, 1966, p. 73)
Deutsch's work is representative of the work of other "integrationists” with political science, anthropological, and sociological
backgrounds.

Another major contribution to integration theory was

Old Societies and N e w States, edited by Geertz (1963).

Geertz iden

tified an "integrative revolution" in the transformation of old
states ("traditional”) into new ("modern”).

The "integrative revolu

tion" involves a shift from "primordian sentiments" for one's ethnic
group towards "civil" loyalty for one's polity.

However,

"primordial

and civil sentiments are not ranged in direct and implicitly evolu
tionary o p p o s i t i o n to one ano t h e r . . . (in the sense of) . . . .
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft" (Geertz, 1963, p. 155).

Primordian

sentiments need to be accommodated in new states while integration
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takes place.
Whether ethnic differentiation is given its political
expression in terms of territorial subunits, political
parties, government posts, executive leadership, or as is
most common, one or another combination of these, the
effort is everywhere to find a formula that will keep the
pace of modernization of the nation's sense of selfhood in
step with the parallel modernization not only of its
political, but of its economic, stratificatory, domestic,
and so on, institutions as well.
(Geertz, 1963, pp. 156157)
Geertz moreover warns that "alternatives to such attempts as
these to construct a civil politics of primordian compromise would
seem to be either Balkanization, Herrenvolk fanaticism, or the
forcible suppression of ethnic assertion by a leviathan state" (p.
157).
Whereas integration is seen by scholars in the Deutsch and
Geertz tradition as a natural and eventually inevitable result of
social mobilization (see Lerner, 1958), it is more rarely recommended
by political and social scientists as a policy to be implemented in
its own right.

However, policies designed to encourage integration

above and beyond the "natural" integrative processes of modernization
are practiced by most new states with ethno-cultural diversity.

Such

policies commonly include the establishment of an integrated national
educational system, a national language, and national symbols.
Socio-linguists, in league with a few commentators from other
disciplines, have debated the uses of different language policies in
the promotion of nation integration.

Most have advocated the general

use of a single national language or lingua franca for the purposes
of national communication and integration (Gellner,

1973; Haugen,
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1966; Kelman,
1967;

cited in Rubin & Jernudd,

Scctton,

1971; Pool,

1972; M. Roff,

1982).

A lingua franca is a "language which is used as a means of
communication between people who have no native language in common"
(Trudgill,

1974,

p. 145).

A national language is de jure the prime

language of governmental communication and of the most educational
instruction.

It need not be a lingua franca.

For Haugen (1966),
Every self-respecting nation has to have a language.
Not
just a medium of communication, a "vernacular" or a
"dialect," but a fully developed language.
Anything less
marks it as underdeveloped . . . [and] the national ideal
demands that there be a single linguistic code by means of
w h i c h . . . c o m m u n i c a t i o n can take place, (p. 928)
Kelman (cited in Rubin & Jernudd,

1971) believed that "language

is a uniquely powerful instrument in unifying a diverse population
and in involving individuals and subgroups in the national system"
(p. 21).

3y promoting "instrumental" and "sentimental" attachment to

the new state, language can even, for short periods,
maintain (a system's) legitimacy— even if it is not work
ing effectively, is facing serious economic difficulties,
or is torn by internal conflicts so that it can adequately
provide for the needs and interest of only some segments
of the population at the expense of others— as long as it
is seen by wide segments of the population as representing
their national (ethnic-cultural) identity.
(p. 23)
This was precisely the case until recently in the Malay peasantry's
position vis-a-vis the government in Malaysia.
The opposing view is that the use of a single language in a
linguistically diverse state is dysfunctional.

The Sapir-Whorf

hypothesis, which claims that language shapes the way we look at the
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world, forms the major linguistic backdrop to this view (Fishman,
1980).

The extended Whorfian hypothesis, which is currently enjoying

a new lease of popularity among socio-linguists, advocates ”a multi
lingual and multicultural world in which 'little peoples' and 'little
languages' would not only be represented but valued" (Fishman,

1982,

p. 32).
A lot of research done on language and cognition has shown that
children learn best through the medium of their mother tongue, espe
cially in the single figure years (Sotomayor,

1977).

These findings

show that a single language for educational instruction in a linguis
tically plural society could hamper cognitive development.
Amongst the political scientists,

Snider (1973) and Enloe (1973)

support a diffuse language policy for linguistically divided develop
ing states.

They argue that the new states are "artificial crea

tions" and that "ethnic affiliations are much more persistent and
pervasive than assumed" (Snider,

1973,

p. 83).

The strongest criticism of policies for language diversity in
developing countries come from Pool (1972).

He cited other research

ers to show that,
Language diversity aggravates political sectionalism;
hinders inter-group cooperation, national unity, and reli
gion multinational cooperation; impedes political enculturation, political support for the authorities and the
regime, and political participation; and holds down
governmental effectiveness and political stability. Simi
larly it is said that language diversity slows economic
development, by, for example, braking occupational mobil
ity, reducing the number of people available for mobiliza
tion into the modern sector of the economy, decreasing
efficiency, and preventing the diffusion of innovative
techniques, (p. 214)
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Pool's ow n research shows that linguistic heterogeneity con
tributes to economic underdevelopment.

He used data on the Gross

Domestic Product Per Capita plotted against size of the largest
language group as a percentage of the population of most of the
countries of the world (see Table 1).

The data shows that although

linguistically homogeneous nations may be either economically devel
oped or underdeveloped, almost all the linguistically heterogeneous
nations are underdeveloped (p. 221).

He concluded that "a planner

who insists on preserving cultural-linguistic pluralism had better be
ready to sacrifice economic progress" (p. 225).
Another aspect of the influence of socioeconomic factors in
language policy is the power of socioeconomic rather than legalpolitical conditions
communication.

to "force" people to use a

If a language is perceived' as a

language of national
means to attain

better employment and a higher social status for an individual,
likely to be learned

and used.

Transversely, a

it is

language which is

seen as a hindrance to socioeconomic status is likely to gradually
drop out of socioeconomic and public usage.
A government language policy which tries to engineer by politi
cal means the functional use of a language will, of course, arouse
political opposition in a linguistically diverse society.

However,

if the alternative is ethno-cultural and linguistic cleavage, politi
cians would be better to opt for a unifying single language of
national communication, except in cases where the implementation of
such a policy would irreparably antagonize major sections of the
society.
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Table 1
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (U.S.$) and
Size of Largest Language Community
(% of Population), c. 1962
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Source. J. Pool.
(1972).
National development and language
diversity.
In J. Fishman (Ed.), Advances in the sociology of
l a n g u a g e (Vol. 2). The Hague: M o u t o n , 1972.
P. 221.

In the vast majority of cases "people wil l learn a language when
it is to their socio-economic advantage to do so” (Scotton,
p. 85).

1982,

It is the language planner's job to persuade people that a

national language is to their socioeconomic advantage if he wants to
encourage political integration.
In conclusion, the integrative power of a single language for
public communication is necessary for the efficient functioning of a
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linguistically plural society and is more likely, in the long run, to
bring about cultural assimilation and a common national identity than
alternative diffuse language policies.

The C o m p a r a tiv e P e r s p e c t iv e

The majority of national case studies on the role of language in
national integration have been conducted by socio-linguists and have
thus concentrated on the linguistic aspects of language policy and
planning (Cooper, 1982; Cobarrubis & Fishman,
Lamy,

1979; Le Page,

1964; Rubin & Jernudd,

1983; Fishman, 1968;

1971).

The main contri

butions to understanding the political implications of language
policy and planning have concentrated on the implementation, and to a
lesser extent,
Enloe,
Rustow,

the selection of a language policy (Das Gupta,

1973; Kelman, cited in Rubin & Jernudd,

1971; M. Roff,

1968;
1967;

1967).

Fishman (1968, 1972a, 1972b), while arguing for greater diver
sity in language policy within linguistically plural states, pre
sented the clearest picture of the process of language policy and
planning in developing nations.

The process involves selection,

codification, elaboration, and implementation.

Selection requires

the primarily political task of choosing what language or languages
should have what roles in the new state.

Codification and elabora

tion are linguistic tasks which involve standardizing and expanding
the selected language(s) if they are not already established lan
guages of international use.

Implementation requires carrying out

programs which will ensure the language or languages are used for the
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purposes intended.
A useful framework in which to view the different language
policies adopted by developing nations is reproduced in Table 2
(adopted from Fishman,

1972a, p. 192).

Fishman identified three groups of developing nations based on
the type of decisions they make on language policy and planning.

"A-

modal nations" have no national "Great Tradition" to refer back to
and from which to facilitate the selection of a national identity.
They tend to select a single national language from one of the "Lan
guages of Wider Communication" (e.g., English and French) and use it
as a tool for political integration.
has adopted English),

Countries like Nigeria (which

the Ivory Coast (which has adopted French),

or

Indonesia (which has adopted Malay, not the language of the majority
Javanese) are examples of these.
'TJni-modal nations" perceive one ethno-cultural "Great Tradi
tion" which must be the focus for national identity.

From it a

single national language is selected, modernized, and implemented as
the prime national communicator.

A Language of Wider Communication

is usually used transitionally until the revamped native language can
take over all its functions.

The Philippines,

Sri Lanka, Ethiopia,

Pakistan, and to a degree, India and Malaysia exemplify this model.
"Multi-modal nations" recognize several "Great Traditions" as
competing for separate recognition.

Policy makers need to balance

their desire for political integration with the political realities
of ethno-cultural diversity and so usually adopt a multi-lingual
approach and use a Language of Wider Communication as a compromise
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Table 2

Language Policy:
National Languages and Languages of
Wider Communication in the Developing Nations

Factor*

I. Type A
Decisions

II. Type B
Decisions

III. Type C
Decisions

1.

Perceived socio
cultural integration

a. No integrating
Great Tradition at
the national level

a. One Great
Tradition at the
national level

a. Several Great
Traditions seeking
separate socio
political recognition

2.

Selection of
National language

b . Governed by
considerations of
political integra
tion: nationism

b . Governed by
considerations
of authenticity:
nationalism

b. Governed by need
to compromise be
tween political inte
gration and separace
authenticities

3.

Adoption of Lan
guage of Wider
Communication

c. Yes, as per
manent, national
symbol

c. Often transi
tionally: for
modern functions

c. Yes, as unifying
compromise (working
language: W)

q«c)

4.

Language Planning
Concerns

d . Minor; exonormatlve standardiza
tion of LWC

d. Modernization
of traditional lan
guage: H or L?

d. Modernization
of several traditional
languages

5.

Bilingualism Goals

e. Local, regional;
transitional to LHC

e. National;
transitional to
indigenous mono
lingual

e. Regional bilingual
(H & L, H & N) &
national bilingual
(W & N)

Biculturlsm Goals

f • Transitional to
modernity or now
integration

f. Traditional
plus m o d e m
spheres

f. Traditional plus
m o d e m spheres

I . A-modal
Nations

II. Uni-modal
Nations

III. Multi-modal
Nations

Types

Sour c e . J. Fishman.
(1972a).
Advances in the sociology of
language (Vol. 2).
The Hague: Mouton.
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lingua franca.

Singapore,

the Cameroon Republic, and the developed

nations like Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium represent this model.
Of course many countries fall between categories.

Swahili is

considered part of a "Great Tradition” by some in East Africa while
others view it as a convenient and non-elite lingua franca (see
Dloughy,

1974; Scotton, 1982; Whiteley,

1971).

The national language

of Tanzania is Swahili and of Kenya is English.
Hindi is the national language of India, but determined opposi
tion from non-Hindi native speakers has meant that other native
(especially Dravidian) languages and English remain in widespread use
(Das Gupta,

1968; Le Page,

1964; Misra,

1982).

However,

after over

35 years of implementation as the national language Hindi has grad
ually been
spreading due to the societal need for the development of
a pan-Indian development medium. . . . Such a role, it has
been realized, has not been fulfilled by English and
cannot be fulfilled by any language other than Hindi, not
because it is the mother tongue of one-third of the popu
lation, but because of the role it has played in the
society up to this time and is fit to play in future.
Nationalism, democratization, the spread of educational
facilities, and economic, political developments have all
congregated in its favor.
(Misra, 1982, p. 157)
Singapore has adopted English as its prime means of communica
tion, although Malay is the national language, and despite having a
population which is 70% Chinese.

This seemingly incongruous situa

tion reflects the political realities of wanting to avoid being
thought of as a "third China" in an anti-Chinese southeast Asia.
The developed world also gives contrasting comparative perspec
tives on language and national political integration.

Whereas the
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United States has been largely successful in achieving linguistic
assimilation (at least until recently),

language and national inte

gration are among the most fundamental issues of Canadian politics.
In Canada the linguistic differences of the English and French
have been reinforced by socioeconomic and geographical differences.
The French notion of having been "conquered” and "ruled" by the
English, and the latter's unwillingness until recently to allow the
former access to national economic and political power have made
linguistic assimilation extremely unlikely for some time to come.
The result is Canada's ongoing experiment with national bilingualism
which seems doomed to failure in most of the country because of the
lack of socioeconomic advantage to be gained by most Canadians in
learning French (Cooper,

1982,

p. 15).

The choices of language policy taken by other countries and the
problems associated with each are a valuable source of study when
trying to understand the role of language policy in Malaysia.

How

ever, the literature on the uniquely Malaysian context must also be
briefly reviewed.

The Malaysian Environment

Most studies on Malaysian politics take an ethnological and/or
pluralist approach (Enloe,

1973;

Esman, 1972; Y. L. Lee, 1980; Lent,

1977; Milne & Mauzy, 1980; Nagata,
1980; Van Vorys,

1975).

1975; Ratnam,

1965;

Snodgrass,

The problems of political integration are

seen in terms of ethnicity, culture,

language, and religion.

The

socioeconomic structure is down-played and sometimes not considered
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at all (e.g., K. H. Lee,

1980).

Recently a number of other, mostly Marxist, approaches have
emerged emphasizing the socioeconomic divisions in Malaysian society
and laying less stress on ethno-cultural cleavages (Brennan, 1982;
N. Chan, 1975; Hussin,

1977; Lim, 1978; Stenson, 1976).

B.

While the

more doctrinaire Marxist approaches tend to overplay class, espe
cially in terms of class consciousness and systematic and integrated
inter-ethnic ruling class exploitation, the case for socioeconomic
analysis is growing (Brennan,

1982).

Although capitalist socio

economic divisions have been in existence since the British interven
tion, it has only been recently that clear intra-ethnic class divi
sions have manifested themselves among the Malays, such as in the
huge Kedah peasant farmers demonstration in 1980 (Far Eastern Eco
nomic Review [FEER], 1980).
Most of the commentators on language policy and politics in
Malaysia have been in favor of the Malaysian government's policy of
promoting gradual integration through the use of Bahasa Malaysia
(Bedllngton, 1978; Esman, 1972; Hj. Omar,

1979; Milne & Mauzy,

Mohamad, 1970; Ratnam, 1965; M. Roff, 1967; Van Vorys, 1975).

1980;
The

alternatives to using political coercion to ensure the implementation
of the national language policy are racial strife and national
disaster.
With, one suspects, au eye on Singapore, other commentators view
the thrusting of the elaborated language of the Malays on the nonMalays as more likely to cause ethnic strife than prevent it (Enloe,
1973; Y. L. Lee, 1980; Snider, 1973).

Snider (1973), taking her cue
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from the ethnological approach described earlier in this chapter, is
critical of the heavy handed attempts of "guided democracy” to pro
mote "fusion.”

She recognizes the impracticability of "geographical

fission" (separation) in the Singapore tradition because of the
complexity of ethnic population distribution.

Instead,

under these circumstances, much more attention should be
given to the problems of promoting inter-ethnic under
standing and respect for ethnic differences, rather than
to implementation of policies which increase pressures for
socio-political integration and/or assimilation into a
Malaysian "nation-state."
(p. 89)
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the whole
basis for the Malay elite's political support:

the successful

manipulation of nationalist symbols to maintain the support of the
peasantry.

Bahasa Malaysia is one of those symbols.

The Marxist interpretations identify three bases for the
cleavages in Malaysian society:

class, relations with international

capitalism, and the historic movement of Chinese and Indian labor to
work in the new capitalist sector of the Malayan economy in the 19th
century (Brennan,

1982; Lim,

1978).

While serving to right the

imbalance caused by over concentration on ethno-cultural factors, its
weakness lies in almost denying the existence of language as a fac
tor.

Neither Lim nor Brennan,

for example,

mentioned that linguistic

differences are a factor in preventing inter-ethnic class unity in
Malaysia.

The problem is that Marxist analysis in general does not

satisfactorily address itself to questions of social and political
integration and whether or not language can play a part in it.

It

prefers to ignore these peripheral issues and concentrate on the
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class struggle.
In reality, contemporary Malaysian society is neither simply
ethno-culturally nor simply socioeconomically divided; it is a com
plex mixture of both.
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CHAPTER III

THE MALAYSIAN CONTEXT

This chapter is divided into two parts.

The first part will

examine the geographical, historical, and constitutional background
of Malaysia.

The second part will examine the origin and extent of

Malaysia's ethnic diversity.

The Geographical, Historical, and
Constitutional Background

Malaysia is located in Southeast Asia close to the Equator
between Latitudes 1 and 7 North and Longitudes 100 and 119 East.
Malaysia's north lies Thailand and Indo-China,

To

to the south are

Singapore and Indonesia, and to the east are the Philippines
(Henderson, 1970, p. 10).

Kuala Lumpur is the capital city with a

population of approximately one million.
occupies two distinct regions.

Geographically, Malaysia

Peninsular Malaysia, also called West

Malaysia (formerly Malaya), extends from the Thai border in the north
to Singapore in the south.

To the east are the East Malaysian states

of Sabah and Sarawak which occupy the northern coast of the island of
Borneo.

These regions are separated by about 469 miles of the South

China Sea.

Peninsular Malaysia has an area of 50,806 square miles,

whereas Sabah and Sarawak occupy 76,775 square miles (Henderson,
p. 13).

Although the eastern states are much larger in area than the

peninsular, the latter has the vast majority of the population and,

27
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most importantly, the political and economic clout.
The population and economic statistics are vital to the under
standing of Malaysia's complex political structure.

Malaysia is a

multiracial country with a population of 14.2 million (Peninsular
Malaysia 11.8 million,

Sarawak and Sabah 2.4 million) in 1980 (Fourth

Malaysia Plan, 1980, p. 215).

In terms of geographical distribution,

83.1% resided in Peninsular Malaysia,

7.7% in Sabah,

Sarawak in 1980 (Fourth Malaysia Plan, p. 216).

and 9.2% in

The population of

Peninsular Malaysia (or West Malaysia) is higher than Sabah and
Sarawak (or East Malaysia) mainly due to the former's greater expo
sure to commercial rural urban development.

Malaysia's population

growth rate in 1980 was 2.7% per annum (Fourth Malaysia Pla n ,
p. 217).

Based on the 1980 census in Peninsular Malaysia,

other indigenous people constitute 53.9%, Chinese 34.9%,
10.5%,

and others 0.7% (Fourth Malaysia Pla n , p. 217).

Malays and

Indians
The popula

tion of Malaysia is largely rural, but the urban percentage is po
litically and economically significant.

In 1980 about 67% lived in

rural areas and 35% lived in- urban areas (Fourth Malaysia P l a n ,
p. 78).

Moreover, urban population growth rates are growing much

faster than rural population growth rates.

The former grew at 4.4%

while the latter only grew at 0.8% in 1976-80 (Fisk & Osman-Rani,
1982,

p. 86).

The breakdown of population by economic activity is

shown in Table 3.

Although the percentage working in agriculture is

declining, it remains the largest source of economic activity.
Table 4 shows the breakdown of population by ethnic group and eco
nomic activity.

Malays constitute the highest percentage in the
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Table 3
Malaysia:

Employment Growth by Sector,
1970

1965

(•000)

(X)

(•000)

1,350.0

52.1

1,786.8

66.0

2.5

217.0

A. Construction
5. Utilities

1975

1965-1990
1978

1980

1990

COOO)

(X)

(■000)

(X)

53.5

1,915.0

A7.6

1,972.5

A3.9

2,066.9

AO.6

2,223.9

31.8

87.3

2.6

87.5

2.2

90.2

2.0

89.6

1.7

93.1

1.3

8.A

289.9

8.7

AA8.0

11.1

587.3

13.1

803.1

15.8

1,368.7

19.5

90.0

3.5

90.6

2.7

159.6

A.O

196.5

A.A

262.8

5.2

A13.6

5.9

16.0

0.6

18.6

0.6

23.9

0.6

27.7

0.6

A9.5

1.0

75.2

l.i

6. Transport, Storage,
& Communication

101.0

3.9

133.A

A.O

180.8

A.5

207.9

A.6

193.2

3.8

263.A

3.8

7. Comoerce:

287.0

11.1

A06.7

12.2

520.9

13.0

602.6

13.A

700.6

13.7

1,11A.6

15.A

1. Agriculture
2. Hinlng and Quarrying
3. Manufacturing

(X)

(•000).

(’000)

(X)

(X)

Wholesale and
retail trade

—

—

379.9

11.A

A82.2

12.0

559.3

12.A

6A8.5

12.7

1.03A.9

1A.8

Finance and
Insurance

—

—

26.8

0.8

38.7

1.0

A3.3

1.0

52.1

1.0

80.7

1.1

526.2

15.7

683.8

17.0

808.9

18.0

927.8

18.2

1,355,3

21.A

8. Services

A63.0

17.9

Producers of
government service

—

—

A03.9

12.0

520. A

12.9

621.8

13.8

710.1

13.9

1.10A.0

15.8

Other services

—

—

122.3

3.7

163.A

A. 1

187.1

A.2

217.7

A.3

3AA.2

A.9

2,590.0

100.0

3,339.5

100.0

A,019.5

100.0

A.A93.6

100.0

5,093.5

100.0

7,001.7

100.0

Source: E. K. Fisk & H. Osman-Rani.
Lumpur: Oxford University Press. P. 136.

(1982).

The political economy of Malaysia.

Kuala
NJ
VO
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Table 4
Peninsular Malaysia:

Employment by Ethnic Groups and Sector, 1967-1968 and 1975
1967/1968
Total

No.
(•000)

Of which

z

Z

All
Races

Malays

.

1975
Total

z

z

Chinese

Indians

No.
(•000)

Of which

%

Z

All
Races

Halays

Z
Chinese

1. Agriculture, forestry,
hunting, & fishing

500.7

21.1

33.7

10.4

1.7

640.1

17.9

28.4

7.2

2. Agricultural products
requiring substantial
processing

718.0

30.4

32.1

21.5

50.9

871.7

24.4

27.3

15.6

72.0

3.0

1.6

5.1

2.9

37.1

1.0

0.7

1.6

214.0

9.0

5.9

15.5

3.5

533.5

15.0

9.7

24.1

5. Construction

78.0

3.3

1.9

5.6

2.7

164.1

4.6

2.7

7.3

6. Electricity, gas, water,
sanitary services

22.11

0.9

0.8

0.4

3.1

37.1

1.0

1.3

0.3

255.2

10.8

5.5

19.1

8.1

492.8

13.8

8.2

22.3

86.2

3.6

3.1

3.6

6.1

146.9

4.1

3.7

4.1

413.0

17.4

15.3

18.6

20.9

643.2

18.0

18.0

17.5

3.5

O.l

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.7

0.2

2,365.4

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

3,567.2

100.0

3. Hlnlng, quarrying
4. Manufacturing

7. Comerce
B. Transport, storage, &
communications
9. Services
10. Not specified

Total

.

Source. E. K. Fisk & H. Osman -Rani .
Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
P. 138.

(1982)

—

—

100.0

100.0
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agricultural sector while Chinese are dominant in the commercial and
manufacturing sectors-

It is also interesting to note that Indians

constitute the majority employed in agriculture producing products
which require considerable processing.

This reflects their concen

tration in the commercial plantation sector.

The decline in the

percentages of Malays and Indians -in the sectors they have been
traditionally associated with reveals to some degree the success of
the government’s Ne w Economic Policy, which has as one of its primary
aims the restructuring of employment between races to ensure that the
ethnic imbalances in economic activity decline and are eventually
eliminated.
Malaysia's history dates back to some Malay Hindu kingdoms of
which the best known were the Kingdom of Lankasuka and subsequently
the 7th Century A.D. Srivijaya Empire.

Later the Javanese Majapahit

Empire extended its influence over most of Malaya to become perhaps
the most powerful kingdom in Southeast Asia.

A Majapahit Prince,.

Parameswara, who was exiled from the Majapahit state of Temasek
(modern Singapore), settled with his followers in Malacca and estab
lished a new dynasty there.

In 1414 Indian Muslims converted

Parameswara to the Muslim faith (Bastin, 1966, p. 86).

Relatively

quickly the majority of Malaya's inhabitants at that time followed
his example and became Muslims.
population is Muslim.

To this day almost 100% of the Malay

During his reign, Malacca prospered with its

political and trade connections with China, India, and the Islamic
World.

With trade, the influence of Islam spread to other parts of

Southeast Asia.
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In 1511, the Portuguese took possession of Malacca and used it
as a major port in their empire (Bastin,

1966,

p. 86).

Portuguese

rule ended in 1641 with the victory of the Dutch who occupied Malacca
for the next

183 years (Bastin,

p. 86).

The transfer of Malacca to

the British in 1824 marked the end of Dutch influence in the Malay
Peninsula.
The British had begun their involvement in the area when they
took possession of Penang in 1786 (Allen, 1968, p. 34).

Prom 1874,

British representatives negotiated agreements with the Malay states
which agreed to accept British protection.

In 1895, the states of

Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang joined to form the
Federated Malay States (FMS) (Allen, p. 36).

In 1909, Thailand

transferred to Britain all rights of suzerainty over the states of
Kelantan,

Trengganu,

Perils,

and Kedah (Allen,

p. 40).

British intervention in the Borneo territories began in 1836
when James Brooke began his rule as the first of Sarawak's "White
Rajahs" (Bastin,

1966, p. 167).

Sabah was brought under British

North Borneo (chartered) company control in 1882 (Bastin,

p.

167).

In 1888, Sarawak and North Borneo became British protectorates and,
in 1946,

crown colonies (Bastin,

p. 168).

Malaya and the Borneo territories were occupied by Japan from
1941 until Japan's surrender in September 1945 (Hanrahan,
p. 4).

1971,

The Federation of Malaya subsequently became independent on

A u g u s t 31, 1957 (Hanrahan, p. 58).

s

During the years following the independence of the Federation of
Malaya,

Sarawak and Sabah underwent considerable constitutional
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advances and on September 16, 1963, Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore
merged with the Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia, but Singapore
separated from the Federation on August 9, 1965 (Enloe, 1973, p. 38).
One of the reasons was due to the Chinese strength in Singapore where
the Chinese population far outnumbered the Malay population.
Malaysia follows a form of parliamentary democracy based on
universal suffrage.

The Head of State is a constitutional monarch

elected for a term of 5 years by the Conference of Rulers.

The

Conference of Rulers consists of the Sultans from each state who
elect one of their body to be King.

The parliament comprises the

King and two Houses: the Dewan Rakyat or The House of Representatives
with 154 members who are fully elected and the Dewan Negara or Senate
with 68 members who are partly elected and partly appointed.

The

Cabinet, a council of ministers drawn from the members of Parliament
carries out the executive functions of the government.

It consists

of a Prime Minister and a number of Cabinet Ministers.

Each of the

states in Malaysia has its own Ruler or Governor and an executive
assembly from which the Menteri Besar or Chief Minister is appointed
(Information Malaysia, 1980-1981, p. 98).

The Extent of Malaysia's Ethnic Diversity

Malaysia is a multiracial country with various customs, lan
guages, and cultures.

In Peninsular Malaysia the population is made

up of Malays, Chinese, Indians, and other ethnic groups.

In East

Malaysia the main groups are non-Malay Austronesians and Chinese
immigrants with a few Malay coastal dwellers.

The Ibans (Sea Dayaks)
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are the biggest group in Sarawak while Kadazans and Dusuns are the
majority in Sabah.

These many races have made Malaysia an ethnically

pluralistic society.

Pluralism exists in modern societies of hetero

geneous organization where language, ethnic groups, socioeconomic
class, and cultural interests are diversified.

In the development

process ethno-cultural diversity can be a building block or a poten
tial stumbling block on the road to a stable society.

However, when

one community is dominant, ethnicity has been the cornerstone of
nationalism (Enloe,

1973, p. 3).

This has been the case of the

Malays in Malaysia.
To have any form of development, or any policy implementation in
Malaysia, is to affect the nature and culture of those who direct
development and those to be developed (Wilson,

1967,

p. v).

Under

standing the development in terms of diverse people is very impor
tant .
Most of the ethnic groups of Peninsular Malaysia are different
not just in appearance, religion, and diet, but also in economic
function.

Aborigines

The a b o r ig in e s
The t h r e e

w e re th e

fir s t

g ro u p s o f t h e a b o r ig in e s

to s e t t l e

in

P e n i n s u l a r M a l a y s ia .

t h a t e x i s t a r e N e g r it o e s ,

S e n o i,

and Jakuns.
The N e g r it o e s

a re

fo u n d

in

th e n o r t h e r n p a r t o f th e p e n in s u la .

U s u a l ly th e y a r e h u n te r s and g a t h e r e r s
j u n g l e and r i v e r s

fo r

th e ir

fo o d .

who depen d p r i m a r i l y

on th e

S o m e tim e s th e y a r e know n as Semang
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and Pangan.

Most of them live in shelters made from sticks and

leaves.
The Senoi are also known as the Sakai and are one of the largest
aboriginal groups.

They live on the mountains and foothills of the

central peninsula.

They are hunters and food gatherers,

like the

Negritoes, but they also practice shifting cultivation for rice and
millet.
The Jakuns, or Proto-Malays, settled in the southern lowlands of
the peninsula.

They also practiced shifting cultivation.

Many of

them have been assimilated into Malay groups.
These three aborigine tribes are akin to the MongoloidIndonesian, Australoid, and Melanesoid.

Most of them still live in

tribes and family groups, although many have settled in villages and
towns.

Their languages vary somewhat from group to group and contain

unique words, but mainly can be classified as archaic Malay.

There

are now about 50,000 aborigines in Peninsular Malaysia (Information
Malaysia, 1980-1981, p. 18).

Malays

The ancestors of the Malays came from Yunan in South China to
Sumatra and Java around 2000 B.C.

Around 1500 B.C., they started to

settle in Peninsular Malaysia (Awang,

1983,

p. 39).

the sparse population of the aboriginal people.
in the extreme north and south of the peninsula.

They displaced

Most of them settled
Nowadays in the

northern peninsula, most of the Malays are poor fishermen and rice
planters, but as one proceeds southwards, there is an increase in
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wealth.

Most Malays live in rural areas in villages.

However,

under

the government's present policy of restructuring society, more Malays
are involved in business and industry and more now live in the urban
areas.

The Malays' staple food is rice, and pig is forbidden to be

eaten because of their Islamic religion.

The slaughtering of animals

for food must follow Islamic rites.
Malays have traditionally been associated with the land and
today remain predominantly rural (65.2% in 1980) (Fourth Malaysia
Plan, 1980,

p. 56).

About one-half the rural Malay population is

involved in some aspect of commercial agriculture (mainly on small
holdings) and the other half are mainly rice growing peasantry or
fishermen.

About two-thirds of the urban Malays are involved in

services (mainly government).

The remainder are mostly urban pro

letariat (see Table 5).
Malays are poorer per capita on average than Chinese and
Indians.

Mean household income for Malays was Malaysian $309 per

month compared to M$459 per month national average in 1979 (see
Table 6) (Fourth Malaysia Plan , 1980,

p. 56).

The language used by the Malays varies.

In the rural areas the

peasantry use one of a number of Malay dialects while the educated
Malay elites increasingly use the codified and elaborated form of
Malay which is the national language, Bahasa Malaysia.

The Malays

thus share a com m o n basic culture, language, and religion.

In short,

they are a united cultural group.
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Table 5
Peninsular Malaysia:

Employment by Occupation and Race, 1970, 1975, and 1980
1970
Malay

(•000)

Chinese
<*)

('000)

Indian
(*)

(•000)

54.0

39.5

14.8

Others

CO

Total

(■000)

CO

(•000)

3.7

2.7

136.7

CO

64.2

47.0

Administrative and nanagerlal

7.4

24.1

19.3

62.9

2.4

7.8

1.6

5.2

30.7

100.0

Clerical and related workers

50.4

35.4

65.4

45.9

24.5

17.2

2.2

1.5

142.5

100.0

Sales and related workers

69.1

26.7

159.6

61.7

28.7

11.1

1.1

0.4

258.5

100.0

Service workers

100.0

44.3

89.5

39.6

32.9

14.6

3.4

1.5

225.8

100.0

Agricultural workers

921.5

72.0

221.3

17.3

123.7

9.7

13.2

1.0

1,278.7

100.0

Production, transport and
other workers

266.0

34.2

434.5

55.9

74.4

9.6

2.5

0.3

777.4

100.0

1,477.6

51.8

1,043.6

36.6

301. 4

10.6

27.7

1.0

2,850.3

100.0

Professional and technical8

Total

10.8

100.0

1975
Professional and technical

91.1

48.0

73.4

38.7

20.8

11.0

4.4

2.3

189.7

100.0

Administrative and nanagerlal

11.6

28.1

24.3

58.8

3.0

7.3

2.4

5.8

41.3

100.0

Clerical and related workers

88.5

4(>.0

78.6

40.8

23.1

12.0

2.4

1.2

192.6

100.0

Sales and related workers

85.9

24 8

227.2

65.7

51.4

9.1

1.2

0.3

345.7

100.0

Service workers

145.7

46.8

123.3

39.6

39.4

12.6

3.1

1.0

311.5

100.0

Agricultural workers

998.1

70.5

257.8

18.2

147.6

10.4

12.6

0.9

1,416.1

100.0

Production, transport and
other workers

434.5

40.6

518. Q

48.4

112.2

10.5

5.6

0.5

1,070.3

100.0

1,855.4

52.0

1,302.6

36.5

377.5

10.6

31.7

0.9

3,567.2

100.0

Total
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Table 5— Continued
1980
Chinese •

Halay
(’000)

(X)

(•000)

(X)

Indian
(’000)

Others

(X)

(*000) (X)

Total
(•000)

(X)

118.2

50.0

87.1

36.9

26.9

11.4

4.0

1.7

236.2

100.0

Administrative and managerial

16.2

31.6

29.2

57.0

3.1

6.1

2.7

5.3

51.2

100.0

Clerical and related workers

169.4

55.3

110.8

36.2

21.0

6.9

5.3

1.7

306.5

100.0

7.6

0.8

100.0

Professional and technical

99.8

23.1

299.0

69.2

32.7

0.2

432.3

Service workers

168.4

47.9

140.1

39.9

40.7

11.6

2.1

0.6

351.3

100.0

Agricultural workers

998.9

67.7

289.9

19.7

175.4

11.9

10.6

0.7

1,474.8

100.0

Production, transport and
other workers

640.6

45.4

601.9

42.6

160.9

11.4

8.7

0.6

1,412.1

100.0

2,211.5

51.9

1,558.0

36.5

460.7

10.8

34.2

0.8

4,264.4

100.0

Sales and related workers

Total

aThis category Includes all professionals, ranging from lawyers and engineers to nurses and
teachers, in public as well as private sectors.

P»

Source.
5 9.

Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1985.

(1980).

Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.
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Table 6
Peninsular Malaysia: Mean and Median Incomes, 1970-79
($ per household per month)
In constant 1970 prices

1970

1973

1976

In current prices

Annual
growth
rate
1971-79
1979
(%)

1973

1976

Annual
growth
rate
1971-79
1979
(%)

Malay

mean
median

172
120

209
141

237
160

309
200

6.7
5.8

242
163

345
233

513
332

12.9
12.0

Chinese

mean
median

394
268

461
298

540
329

659
383

5.9
4.1

534
343

787
480

1,094
636

12.0
10.1

Indian

mean
median

304
194

352
239

369
247

467
314

4.9
5.5

408
277

538
360

776
522

11.0
11.6

Others

mean
median

813
250

1,121
306

870
270

1,132
331

3.8
3.2

1,299
355

1,268
394

1,881
550

9.8
9.2

All

mean
median

264
166

313
196

353
215

459
270

6.3
5.6

362
227

514
313

763
449

12.5
11.7

Urban

mean
median

428
265

492
297

569
340

675
368

5.2
3.7

570
345

830
495

1,121
611

11.3
9.7

Rural

mean
median

200
139

233
159

269
180

355
230

6.6
5.8

269
184

392
262

590
382

12.8
11.9

ment.

Source. Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1985.
P. 59.

(1980).

Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Depart
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Chinese

The early 15th century marked the first contact between Peninsu
lar Malaysia and China.

During this period, the Chinese who ventured

to Malaya were mostly small scale traders.

The major Chinese influx

was during British rule in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Hender
son,

1970, p. 35).

There were a lot of opportunities for development

which required labor and service and the Chinese were ready and
willing to provide the British with the needed workers.
mining industry in particular attracted Chinese labor.

The tin
Most of them

came from the southern provinces of China.
They are concentrated on the west
cially in towns and industrial areas.

coast of the peninsula, espe
The majority of them

local-born and have made Malaysia their permanent home.

are

However,

prior to World War II most considered Malaya only as a temporary
shelter,

to prosper in before returning w i t h their fortune to China.

They usually speak a variety of dialects.

Some of these are:

Hakka,

Cantonese, Hokkein, Teochew, Mandarin, and Hainanese.
The Chinese are predominantly urban (53.8% in 1980) (Fourth
Malaysia Plan, 1980, p. 55).

The urban Chinese are mainly involved

in service industries, commerce, and manufacturing.

Most rural

Chinese are involved in commercial agricultural and fishing.

The

Chinese share of the mean national income is proportionately high,
although it has decreased from 149% of'

the national average

in1970

to 144% in 1979 (Fourth Malaysia P l a n , p. 55).
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Due to their different dialect groups and social aggregates,

the

term "Chinese" tends to hide the considerable cultural and social
heterogeneity of the Chinese population in Malaysia.

In d ia n s

The Indian migration to Peninsular Malaysia began with the
coming of Islam to Malaysia from India, and was mainly based on
trade.

However,

peninsula.

the main migration was during British rule of the

It started on a small scale for public works such as

construction of roads and railways.

Then the migration became a

flood with the rubber boom after 1905 (Henderson,

1970, p. 39).

The

Increasing development of rubber estates had increased the demand for
estate labor, which Malays were reluctant to fill.
M ost o f th e

In d ia n s

o r ig in a te d

and th e y w e r e m a i n l y T a m i l s .

fr o m

T h e r e w e r e a l s o S ik h s , who came fr o m

th e n o r t h o f I n d i a , and a s i g n i f i c a n t
T h e i r la n g u a g e s
H in d u is m

is

in c l u d e T a m i l ,
th e

not

a g a in s t

In

it

is

is

th e ir

p la n ta tio n s .

A h ig h p e r c e n ta g e

O t h e r u r b a n In d ia n s
T a b le 5).

a re

fo o d ,

and th e H in d u s do

b e lie fs .

The I n d i a n
th e

in

A lm o s t a l l

In d ia n s

a re

p r o fe s s io n a ls .

t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and com m erce (s e e

s h a re o f th e n a t i o n a l in c o m e p e r c a p i t a

n a t io n a l p e r c a p ita

th e

on c o m m e r c ia l a g r i c u l t u r a l

o f u rb a n

in v o lv e d

and T e le g u .

b u t some a r e

1980, 58% o f th e I n d i a n p o p u la t io n was r u r a l .
a r e a g r i c u l t u r a l la b o r e r s

to

s t a p le

In d ia n s .

M a la y a la m ,

t h e ir r e lig io u s

r u r a l In d ia n s

c lo s e

H in d i,

m a in r e l i g i o n o f th e I n d i a n s ,
R ic e

s in c e

n um ber o f M u s lim

P u n ja b i,

M u s lim s and C h r i s t i a n s .
eat beef

th e s o u th e rn p a r t o f I n d ia ,

a v e ra g e

(s e e T a b le

is

6 ).
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Other Races

Other ethnic groups that live in West Malaysia are Eurasians,
Europeans, Siamese, Arabs, and Indonesians.

They comprise less than

2% of the population (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1980, p. 58).
Eurasians are those with Portuguese or Dutch blood.
have intermarried with the Indians and Chinese.
Catholicism.

The

Most of them

Their religion is

The Europeans in Malaysia largely work in large commer

cial agricultural or industrial enterprises.

They enjoy mean incomes

far above the national average.
In the northern part of Peninsular Malaysia there are a number
of Siamese residents.

Most of them migrated from Thailand.

Some

Arabs came long ago as traders and have made Malaysia their home.

An

indeterminate number of Indonesians migrated to Malaysia to work as
farmers.
community.

Presently Indonesians are being assimilated into the Malay
Both the Arabs and the Indonesians are Muslims and thus

easily assimilate with the Malays.
In East Malaysia the ethnic composition is very different from
West Malaysia.

Although the Chinese population remains at about one-

third of the total, the Malays constitute about one-sixth and the
Indians less than 1% of the population of the two states combined.
Native Austronesian groups comprise over half the population.

These

ethnic groups include the Ibans, Bidayuhs, Melanaus, Kayans, Kenyahs,
Kelabits, and Punans in Sarawak and the Kadazans, Bajaus, Muruts, and
Dusuns in Sabah.

(Table 7 shows the comparative population statis

tics for East and West Malaysia

[The Europa Yearbook, 1983, p. 895].)
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Table 7
Principal Race
(Estimated as at December 31, 1979)

Peninsular
Malaysia

Sabaha

Sarawak

Chinese

3,876,532

178,469

383,504

Malays

6,050,361

49,937

244,999

Indians and Pakistanis

1,158,680

--

--

Land Dyak

--

--

110,066

Malanau

--

--

66,630

Kadazan

--

238,046

--

Bajau

--

109,108

--

Murut

--

39,282

--

Ibans

--

--

354,158

Other indigenous

--

176,777

64,122

83,004

189,925

12,058

Other

a 1978 figures.
Source. The Europa yearbook, 1983 survey (Vol.2).
London: Europa Publications, Ltd.
P. 895.

(1983).

Most of the East Malaysian indigenous people are rural shifting
cultivators, although many are getting services-based employment
under the government's Ne w Economic Policy.

They are predominantly

Christian but a few have been converted to Islam.

In the more remote

areas many have remained animist.
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This chapter has showed the extent to which Malaysia is ethni
cally diverse.

The basic ethnic divisions are reinforced by reli

gious and cultural differences.

Most importantly, these divisions

are further compounded by differences in economic function, which
have traditionally mapped all-too-neatly onto the ethno-cultural
divisions.

The unequal development between the modern capitalist

sector using imported British capital and imported Chinese and Indian
labor on the one hand, and the traditional feudal Malay sector on the
other,

set the background to the diversity.

The British belief that

the immigrant Chinese and Indians would not remain in Malaya and
their "pro-Malay" policy (which gave Malays special positions in the
civil service and reserved Malay land for sale to Malays only) com
pounded the separation of the races.

This was reflected in the

colonial education system and, later, in the political system which
developed with the coming of independence.

It is the political

system that is discussed in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV

CULTURAL PLURALISM IN MALAYSIAN POLITICS

This chapter examines the pluralism existing in Malaysia and her
political structure.

Pluralism

Pluralism is "the doctrine that governmental authority within a
community should be distributed among various functional groups and
neither monopolized nor shared by a sovereign power in the State"
(A. Smith,

1983, p. 45).

Pluralism involves complexity, with multiple causation factors
and a large number of interactions and inputs to the political pro
cess (McFarland,

1969, p. 19).

Lijphart
(1977) saw that the sub»«

divisions of pluralist society can go in different,

even conflicting,

directions and so disperse power and limit the authority of the
rulership (p. 12).

Dahl (1982) saw pluralism as "polyarchy," the

multiplicity of rulers.
is unfavorable.

He said that foreign dominance of a polity

He also said that pluralism refers to organizational

pluralism, that is, in the existence of a plurality of relatively
autonomous (independent) organizations (subsystems) within the domain
of a state (p. 5).
Pluralism can be classified into political pluralism, social
pluralism, and cultural pluralism.

"Political pluralism describes a

society in which power is widely distributed among numerous groups
45
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arrayed in shifting patterns of conflict, competition, and coopera
tion with one another” (Plano & Riggs,

1973,

p. 3).

Pluralism in

volves sharing power in the government and other social institutions.
Democracy is a precondition for political pluralism.
Social pluralism usually emphasizes the role of voluntary groups
in an industrial society.

It is sometimes contrasted with cultural

pluralism in which "natural" groupings are based on race,
caste, or religion.

language,

Social pluralism is concerned with the clash of

group interests within an overall value consensus, whereas cultural
pluralism is a product of basic value cleavages (Plano & Riggs,
p.

1973,

59).
Cultural pluralism can be described as "cultural democracy."

It

guarantees the rights of ethnic groups in a democratic society to
maintain their communal identity and subcultural values (Gordon,
1964, p. 262).

Cultural pluralism emphasizes the existence of dis

tinct cultures in a political system— having as groups, distinct
religions, ethical systems, authority systems, usages in rearing
children, languages, gestural systems, and ways of giving accounts of
and valuing satisfactory or unsatisfactory human performance.

The Historical Origins of Cultural
Pluralism in Malaysia

The world system approach may be used in locating the origins of
ethnic contacts for international movement of capital and labor
across states.

Here, social and economic forces determine the move

ment of capital and labor under different periods.

Under different
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periods, different forms of ethnic relations emerge.
different

These include

ideologies , too.

During the pre-Colonial period (before 1850),
settlers were the aborigines and the Malays.

the original

It was in the late 14th

century that Malaya was put on the international map.
mainly due to its trading role.

This was

Most economic activities, however,

were undertaken by the immigrants.

Because of this there were con

tacts between Chinese merchants and the Malay rulers.

The subsequent

political influence was in the form of alliances with local rulers
rather than direct conquest.
Malaya because of spices.

The Europeans,

too, were interested in

This interest led to the exodus of most of

the Chinese merchants and the subsequent European control of the
spice trade.
The British demand for spices had led to the establishment of
commercial agricultural plantations and their demand for tin led to a
massive influx of Chinese capital and labor.

The necessity for labor

on the plantations grew rapidly after rubber replaced spices as the
chief agricultural product.

Meanwhile, the Malays, unwilling by and

large to join the growing mining and agricultural proletariats,
remained in the feudal sector in the padi fields.

This situation

became accentuated with formal British control of Malaya (1874-1957)
and the establishment of Malay land reservations which protected
Malay rights to the land.

Table 8 shows the ethnic composition of

the labor force in the various sectors in 1931 (Hui, 1980, p. 137).
Most of the Indians and the Chinese at first came to Malaya to
be birds of passage, making a little money and returning to enjoy it
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in their own homelands.

Socioeconomic and political conditions in

India and China encouraged many to settle down and make Malaya their
permanent home.

A similar influx of Chinese interested in trade

rather than tin occurred in Sarawak and Sabah.

In this way the

percentage of "immigrants" in the population increased until the
British halted all immigration, fearing that the Malays would become
a dispossessed minority in their own country

'"’he roughly equal

balance between "natives" and immigrants was already set, however,
and Malaya and Sarawak and Sabah were destined to learn to live with
ethno-cultural diversity.

Table 8
Ethnic Composition of Labor Force in the Federated Malay
States in 1931 in the Estate, Mining, and Fadi Sectors

Estate

No.

Padi

Mines

%

No.

%

No.

%

4,821

3

813

1

89,122

97

Chinese

32,916

23

70,704

92

1,038

1

Indians

104,767

74

4,168

7

1,892

2

142,504

100

76,685

100

92,052

100

Malays

Total

Source. L. M. Hui.
(1980). Ethnic and class relations in
Malaysia.
Journal of Contemporary Asia Quarterly, 10(2),
p. 137.
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Malaya gained political independence on August 31, 1957.

Power

was smoothly transferred from the colonial administration to the
Malay, largely aristocratic, bureaucratic, and land-owning elite who
were in alliance with Chinese and Indian commercial, bureaucratic,
and professional elites (Brennan,

1982, pp. 193-198).

The economy

was and remains largely in the hands of foreign investors and their
subordinate partners, the non-Malays.

Power and poverty were con

trasted to a degree which was bound to produce instability.
T h e s o c io e c o n o m ic c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b e tw e e n t h e M a la y s and th e n o n M a la y s becam e m o re a p p a r e n t a f t e r
lo c a l e lit e s

to o k o v e r p o l i t i c a l

th e B r i t i s h

d e p a r t u r e w hen th e

p o w e r.

The ethno-cultural and socioeconomic diversity of Malaysia has
created cleavages and conflicts in the society.

Moreover,

the nature

of the Malaysian economy and its position relative to foreign capital
has exacerbated the already serious divisions.

As the Malaysia

economy has expanded, disparities in power, wealth, mobility, and
cosmopolitanism have intensified within and between ethno-cultural
groups.
T he p ro b le m s o f c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m

i n M a l a y s ia a r e s o c io 

e c o n o m i c a ll y g ro u n d e d , b u t m a n i f e s t th e m s e lv e s
and o t h e r c u l t u r a l phen o m en a.
p u rp o s e s ,

is

M ost n o ta b le

in

p o litic s ,

r e lig io n ,

am ongst th e s e , f o r o u r

la n g u a g e .

M o s t o f t h e im m ig r a n t s who came d u r in g t h e p r e - C o l o n i a l and
C o l o n i a l p e r io d to o k p a r t

in

t h e m o d ern c a p i t a l i s t

e c o n o m y , w h ic h was d e v e lo p in g f a s t .
C h in e s e and t h e

In d i a n s .

s e c to r o f

th e

T h e s e im m ig r a n t s w e r e th e

T h e y b r o u g h t a lo n g

th e ir

c u s to m s ,
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religions, and languages which were very different from those of the
local Malays.

Other immigrants came in from Sumatra and Java.

How

ever, because they had similar customs and languages and the same
religion as the local Malays,

they assimilated.

During the early Colonial period, there were conflicts over
mining rights and over the succession of rulers which were mainly
tied to commercial and economic interests.
the control of the mines.

There was a struggle for

It was between the Chinese miners and

merchants and the Malay aristocracy.

Violence frequently broke out;

and because there was no properly administered police force, it could
not be controlled.

The British,

at that time, had only "advisors" in

the Malay states.
The local Malay authorities were unable to deal with the social
and economic stresses and invited the British in to preserve their
positions.

In return the British gained a colony which turned out to

be very profitable.
intervention:

Hui (1980) commented on the full-scale British

"Capital cannot profitably exploit resources under

conditions of political instability.

Pax Britannica was therefore a

precondition for the further penetration of British capital into
M a l a y a " (p. 136).
Political activity prior to World War II was largely limited to
competing petitions from rival ethnic elites to the British adminis
trators.

These petitions were not for independence but to promote or

safeguard one ethnic group’s position vis-a-vis the others.

The

dominance of the "pro-Malay" section amongst the British ensured
rights for the Malays.

These "special rights" included:

the rights
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of Malays to ownership of most of the land; Malay dominance of the
Civil Service, police, and army;

guarantees that there would be no

attempts to convert Malays to religions other than Islam; and guaran
tees of the rights of the Malay ruling aristocracy (Hui, 1980, p.
140).

Moreover, the British halted non-Malay immigration in 1938 to

prevent non-Malays outnumbering Maldys (Hui, p. 141).
During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945),
brutalized by the Japanese.

the Chinese were

As a result many Chinese joined the

Malayan Communist Party to fight against the Japanese and any people
who collaborated with the Japanese invaders.
Party was also a threat to the British.

The Malayan Communist

Because of the threat, after

World War II, the British focused on the communists rather than
domestic problems.
The Japanese actively encouraged Malay-Indonesian and Indian
nationalism among the Malays and Indians during the occupation.
achieved limited success due to their heavy-handed actions.
the Japanese occupation brought about political changes.
the image of British invincibility was smashed.
Chinese joined the Malayan Communist Party.

They

However,

Firstly,

Secondly, many

Thirdly, many working

class Malayans of all ethnic groups became radicalized and unionized,
especially among the Indian plantation workers (Stenson,
p.

1970,

36).
The British attempted to centralize and modernize politics when

they returned after World War II.

They proposed a Malayan Union

which would abolish the position of the Malay rulers (who had been
collaborating with the Japanese) and grant citizenship and equal
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rights to all people domiciled in Malaya.

Strong protest from Malays

forced a return to the "pro-Malay" policy and the Federation of
Malaya agreement in 1948.
The politically decisive factor in the period after 1945 was
that the Malays "were . . . politically aroused and united to an
unprecedented degree, whereas Chinese and Indians were divided by
class as well as ethnic,

linguistic, and political divisions"

(Stenson, 1975, p. 47).
The clearest illustration of Malay ethnic unity compared to
Chinese class divisions was the composition of the Malayan Communist
Party at the time:

almost all were Chinese or Indians.

There was an

outbreak of communist insurgency under British rule in 1948 which
resulted in "the Emergency" that lasted until 1960 (Hanrahan,
p. 3).

1971,

Before World War II the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was not

a major force in local politics.

The MCP declared its full support

for the allies during the Japanese occupation of Malaya.

The British

trained some squads of the communists to destroy the Japanese.
the MCP became a threat to the British.

Consequently, the majority

of the communist military arm was disbanded.
not totally destroyed (Hanrahan,

Later

However, the MCP was

p. 84).

The Political Manifestations of Socioeconomic and
Ethno-Cultural Diversity

The dominant factors influencing Malaysia's political structure
are those of race, class,

religion, and culture.
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From Independence to May 13, 1969

The three major ethnic group elites formed a political alliance
in the early 1950s through their communal parties:
National Organization (UMNO),

the United Malays

the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA),

and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).

U MNO had been founded in 1946

by Dato' Onn bin Jaafar (Information Malaysia, 1980-1981,

p. i8).

It

was first formed to fight against the creation of the Malayan Union
and to spearhead the struggle for independence.

Later it became the

dominant party in Malaysian politics.
The MCA was also founded in 1946.

It was first a welfare orga

nization and later assumed a political role in the early 1950s when
it teamed up with UMNO (Information Malaysia, 1980-1981,
The MIC was founded in 1946.

p. 18).

Its aims were to- protect the

interests of the Indians and especially to get rid of the "plantation
laborer" stereotype.

In 1954 MIC joined the M C A and UMNO to form the

Alliance (Information Malaysia, 1980-1981,

p. 18).

This Alliance Party, composed of the three elements above,

was

formed on a tacit agreement which had been enshrined in the independ
ence constitution of 1957.
In broad terms it guaranteed Malay political and adminis
trative predominance, with special assistance to promote
Malay education and economic uplift, while guaranteeing
citizenship rights and freedom from interference for nonMalay commerce, culture and individuals.
(Stenson, 1976,
p. 47).
The Alliance was registered as a political party only in 1958.
As time passed, the situation changed.

The non-Malays demanded

more than a symbolic political role, whereas the Malays wanted to
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participate more in the modern sector of the economy.

The competi

tion between the ethnic segments of the ruling elite manifested
itself at lower levels of the socioeconomic structure in terms of
communal conflict.

The elite-manipulated communal rivalries were

reinforced by socioeconomic problems, notably huge disparities in
wealth and growing unemployment and underemployment.
The increase in communal tensions caused an outbreak of violence
after the M a y 10, 1969, e l e c t i o n (Tiek, 1971, p. 17).
1969,

bloody racial rioting occurred (Tiek, p. 17).

reasons for the rioting.
Malays were increasing.
Chinese majority,
32).

On M a y 13,

There were many

Ethnic tensions between Malays and nonThen the separation of Singapore, with its

from Malaysia in 1965 heightened tension (Tiek, p.

"Positive Discrimination" favoring the Malays upset the non-

Malays and yet the Malays felt underprivileged because they were
largely employed in subsistence agriculture, whereas the non-Malays
controlled most of the cash economy and urban employment.
also personal factors and differences in political styles.

There were
The MCA

was losing the support of the Chinese community; and as a result,
UMNO felt it was being let down by its Alliance partners.

Moreover,

the main opposition parties, the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)
and the Democratic Action Party (DAP),

were gaining support.

PAS began as a religious section of UMNO but separated in the
early 1950s (Information Malaysia,

1980-1981).

The D'P was an off

shoot of Singapore's ruling People's Action Party.

It was and still

is the strongest non-Malay opposition party and a contender for the
MCA's Chinese votes.

These opposition parties had all gained ground
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in their election against UMNO and the MCA.
Supporters of the opposition parties (mainly Chinese) held a
victory procession in the streets of Kuala Lumpur.

Malay mobs

attacked the Chinese, Chinese gangs counterattacked, and the violence
spread.

Police and army did not prevent the Malay attacks and, on

occasion, attacked Chinese themselves.

Though the violence was only

in Kuala Lumpur, 2 days later a nationwide state of emergency was
declared.

The country was ruled by the National Operations Council

(NOC) for the following 21 months.

In February 1971, Parliamentary

rule was restored to the surprise of many foreign observers (Tiek,
1971, p. 23).
This 1969 incident also led to the retirement of the Prime
Minister, Tungku Abdul Rahman,

in 1970 (Tiek, 1971, p. 52).

His

place was taken by Tun Abdul Razak.

After 1969

The new government was determined to give the state a much
greater role in molding Malaysian society.

It formulated various

policies to achieve national unity and the economic and social de
velopment of the country.

Some of these were:

"Rukunegara," the

formation of the National Front Party, and the New Economic Policy,
as well as using Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of national educa
tional instruction and the prime means of public communication in the
country.

Although we are primarily concerned with the last policy,

the first three are directly linked to its formulation and imple
mentation.
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"Rukunegara"

With the race riots of 1969, the political and economic outlook
of Malaysia looked grim.
people for the government,

In order to bring back confidence in the
it formed the "Rukunegara.”

It reiterated

Malaysia's commitment to achieving a greater unity of all her
peoples,

to maintaining a democratic way of life, to creating a just

society in which the wealth of the nation would be equitably shared,
to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural
traditions, and to building a progressive society that will be
oriented to modern science and technology (Information Malaysia,
1980-1981).
unity.

Following this there were five principles for national

These are belief in God, loyalty to the King and country,

upholding the Constitution, rule of the law, and good behavior and
morality.

Thus, "Rukunegara" was to bind the people together where

"rukun” is the principle or basis and "negara" is nation (Informa
tion Malaysia, p. 40).

National Front Coalition

The six bases of the National Front are:

national unity,

national security, the economy, foreign policy, religion, and social
services (Mauzy, 1978, p. 170).
W-

The National Front, which is known as the Barisan Nasional in
Bahasa Malaysia, was registered on June 1, 1974.

The government

tried to solve the problems of "sides" which usually occurred in
elections with competing parties.

In order to have political unity
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and economic stability the National Front combined 11 political
parties under its banner.

It is a multiracial coalition.

The com

ponent parties are UMNO, MCA, MIC, Sarawak United Peoples' Party
(SUPP), Partai Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu (PPBB), Sarawak National
Party (SNAP),

United Sabah National Organization (USNO),

Berjaya,

Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP), and
Berjasa.
SUPP was formed in the early 1960s (Information Malaysia, 19801981, p. 41).

Their supporters were mainly native and Chinese

Sarawakians.

The PPBB is a dominant party in Sarawak and it is a

merger of two parties:

the Iban-based Partai Pesaka and the Muslim-

based Partai Bumiputra.

SNAP, another Sarawakian Dayak-based party,

was co-opted into joining the National Front (NF) in 1971 (Informa
tion Malaysia, p. 42).

USNO and Berjaya are the dominant members of

the Sabah National Front.

Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia joined the NF

after winning in Penang in the 1969 general election (Information
Malaysia, p. 42).

PPP joined the NF in the early 1970s (Information

Malaysia, p. 42).

This party is concentrated in Perak State.

Lastly,

there is Berjasa which was formed by PAS dissidents in the

1960s (Information Malaysia, p. 42).

This leaves the legal opposi

tion parties which are the DAP (Democratic Action Party), PAS
(Islamic Party), and some fragmentary socialist parties.
The DAP, although ncncommunal in policy, has become over
whelmingly non-Malay in membership.

It opposes the National Front's

authoritarian dictates and its ethnic-based policies.

PAS is an

Islamic fundamentalist party and is mainly based on the Malay
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peasantry in the north and east of Peninsular Malaysia.

It advocates

an Islamic state and totally disregards the rights of the non-Muslims
in Malaysia.

The socialist parties have, on occasion, united into a

Socialist Front.

These parties have some intellectual and labor

union support and recently have challenged both UMNO and PAS for
Malay votes

on the east coast

of the peninsula.

represent a

serious threat to

the ruling elite.

However,

they donot

New Economic Policy (NEP), 1971

The overriding goal of the NEP is the promotion of national
unity.

It has two subgoals.

These are the eradication of poverty

irrespective of race, and the restructuring of Malaysian society in
such manner that economic functions would ultimately not be identi
fied with race or ethnic .groups (Fourth Malaysia Pla n , 1980, p. 7).
The NEP helps to raise Bumiputra (indigenous Malaysians, mainly
Malays) income and status by establishing job quotas and to raise
Bumiputra ownership of incorporated companies from a fraction to 30%
by 1990 ("Booming Malaysia," 1981, p. 67).

The requirement for doing

business is

to have Malay partners and shareholders.

should have

their fair share,

The Malays

and that share should come from growth.

In response to the NEP there were complaints from the non-Malays
about how special assistance was being provided to the Malays.

The

non-Malays stated that they were in the position of Peter being
robbed to pay Paul (Kamm,

1972, p. 4).

Nevertheless,

the present

Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, stated that the NEP was made on
behalf of the Malays and was based on their needs.

Mahathir
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diagnosed the weakness of the Malays in the modern sector as result
ing from heredity, lack of education, adverse legislation, and the
severe competition from non-Malays.

He also stated that people

usually go beyond the formal insistence on "Malay Privileges" but
sometimes take little account of the problem of enforcement.

For

example, "can non-Malay shopkeepers be prevented from competing too
keenly with Malays by regulations prohibiting them from bargaining or
giving credit?"

"How could such regulations be enforced?”

(Mohamad,

1970, p. 117).

Recent Political Developments

Whereas ethno-cultural cleavages were of prime concern to the
government in the aftermath of the May 1969 riots,
divisions are increasingly the focus of attention.

socioeconomic
These divisions

are most noticeable between the Malay aristocratic and bureaucratic
elites in alliance with the non-Malay capitalists on one side and the
Malay peasantry on the other.
The growing and ostentatious disparity between the Malay elites
(the traditional aristocracy and the new bureaucrats) and the peas
antry is illustrated by both economic figures ("Malaysia:

Trouble in

Paradise,” 1983, p. 295) and displays of power and privilege.
The frustrations of the Malay peasantry have been largely chan
neled, in the all-too-common tradition of rural ignorance, into
millenarian religious sentiments which are expressed in the Malaysian
context as Islamic fundamentalism.

Thus, there has been a consider

able growth among the rural masses of support for some form of pure

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60
Islamic state.
channels.

This has been expressed through various political

The main Islamic fundamentalist party (PAS) and its break

away groups as opposition parties demand immediate and full Islamization and claim the government is un-Islamic, with the former stress
ing the Iranian model more than the latter.

Within the National

Front, fundamentalists in Berjasa and, especially, UMNO are attempt
ing to influence the government to implement Islamic policies, and
with some considerable success.

In 1983, for example, Malaysian

Muslims were banned from working in or even entering the Genting
Highlands Casino; an Islamic University was set up in Kuala Lumpur;
an Islamic Bank was opened in Kuala Lumpur; and Islamic dress codes
restricting all Malaysians were implemented in many federal and state
controlled organizations,
("Malaysia:

such as institutions of higher education

Islam Sharpens the Knife Edge" 1980, p. 25;

"Malaysia:

Trou b l e in P a r a d i s e , " 1983, p. 295).
Meanwhile Parti Socialis Raakyat Malaysia (FSRM), a socialist
party, is attempting to promote the connection between socialist and
Islamic internationalism and social welfare policies.

The MCP has

not been above tapping this socioeconomically induced fundamentalist
revival.

Its Islamic Front organization has been so successful that

now, for the first time in the history of MCP, more Malays than
Chinese are joining the party.
In short, the Islamic fundamentalist revival has challenged the
view of most scholars of Malaysian politics,

that the basic divisions

in the society are ethno-cultural (e.g., Esman,

1972; Van Vorys,

1975) and has highlighted the growing conflict between the rural
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Malay masses with the recently urbanized and rapidly growing Malay
proletariat and the Malay-dominated bureaucratic and Chinesedominated commercial elites.
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CHAPTER V

BAHASA MALAYSIA AS A UNIFYING FORCE

This chapter examines the role of language policy and planning
in nation-building.
national language,
language,
Malaysia.

It studies the politics of the selection of a
the problems of standardizing and implementing the

and evaluates the effect of having a national language in
It argues that there were linguistic historical and,

particularly, political reasons for selecting Bahasa Malaysia as the
prime language of national communication.

Finally, it shows h o w the

national language policy has already achieved the objectives it set
out to attain.

It has maintained the unity of the Malays across

class lines to a large degree and has greatly contributed towards
integrating the non-Malays into the Malay dominated educational and
political system.
Language is able to shape the attitudes of individuals and
groups (Fishman,

1980).

Different languages will shape differently

the attitudes of different speakers in a linguistically diverse
country like Malaysia.

The role of Bahasa Malaysia as a process of

socialization of the non-Malays into Malaysian society is comprehen
sive.

The process includes language as a communication vehicle

between the races,

language usage in the establishment of a relation

ship and for solidarity, language as a medium of instruction, and
language use in the coordination of the activities of the state.

62
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The R o le o f N a t i o n a l L a n g u a g e i n M a la y s ia

The r o l e

o f la n g u a g e as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f n a t i o n a l u n i t y and

n a tio n -b u ild in g is

g r e a t l y e m p h a s iz e d i n

to o l f o r e th n o - c u ltu r a l in te g r a t io n
M a la y

p o litic a l
D u r in g

and u n o f f i c i a l l y

as a

as a t o o l f o r

u n ity .

th e C o lo n ia l p e r io d , th e B r i t i s h

la n g u a g e s h o u ld be u t i l i z e d

w e re fo rm e d .

d iffe r e n tia tio n .

g o v e rn m e n t b e l i e v e d

as a n in s t r u m e n t t o

p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m ic i n t e r e s t s .
tio n

M a l a y s ia o f f i c i a l l y

T h e re b y ,

T h e s e w e re s t a t u s
U nder s ta tu s

fo s te r B r itis h

tw o ty p e s

d iffe r e n tia tio n

d iffe r e n tia tio n ,

th a t

of d iffe r e n tia 
and s o c i a l

th e E n g lis h

la n g u a g e

was used b y th e M a la y a r i s t o c r a c y and th e M a la y la n g u a g e was u sed b y
th e p e a s a n t r y .

On th e o t h e r h a n d ,

s o c ia l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n

v e r n a c u l a r m e d ia o r la n g u a g e s w e r e used i n
T h e re fo re ,

s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m

e d u c a t io n p o l i c y and p r a c t i c e .

becam e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d

In s tr u c t io n

th e m edium o f E n g lis h a im e d a t p o l i t i c a l ,

g o a ls .

w h e re

C h in e s e and T a m il s c h o o ls .

in

w h ile

e c o n o m ic ,

T he e f f e c t was t h a t g ro u p s e d u c a te d i n

in s tr u c t io n

and c u l t u r a l

th e v e r n a c u la r te n d e d

to come c l o s e r t o g e t h e r as c o m m u n itie s s h a r in g a common c u l t u r e ;
common la n g u a g e ; and e v e n t u a l l y ,
a s p ir a t io n s .
e d u c a t io n
tiv e

fo r

d u t ie s .

p o lic y .

T he B r i t i s h
th e e l i t e

common p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s

w e re o n ly

in te r e s te d

in

a

and

p r o v id in g a W e s te r n

M a la y s so t h a t t h e y c o u ld p e r fo r m a d m i n i s t r a 

T h e r e was no e f f o r t

to

f o r m u l a t e a n a t i o n a l e d u c a t io n

T he n o n -M a la y s had to p r o v id e

v e r n a c u la r , w h ile

in

th e m edium o f th e

v e r n a c u l a r was a s s o c ia t e d w i t h c u l t u r a l o b j e c t i v e s ,
in

is

th e m a j o r i t y

th e ir

own e d u c a t io n i n

th e

o f th e M a la y s w e re e d u c a te d m i n i m a l l y ,
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if

at a ll,

in

r e lig io u s

M a la y -m e d iu m

s c h o o ls .

Efforts were made as early as 1956 to establish national educa
tion policies with the aim of uniting the various people through the
school system (Education in Malaysia, 1980, 1981,

p. 3).

Bahasa

Malaysia was gradually to replace English as the main medium of
instruction in order to "nationalize" the education system.
Nationalism in this context was an instrument to reduce the ethno
cultural conflicts and promote Malay unity in Malaysia.

One must

also recognize that language is a form of human capital and education
is an investment.

Language requires the use of resources that are

valuable in society.

Those who have a second language naturally are

at an advantage and have a broader base for communication.

Languages

are not all alike but they are all certainly a means of communica
tion.

Before proceeding to investigate the reasons for the selection

of Bahasa Malaysia as the national language and the medium of educa
tional instruction, we must look at educational development in
Malaysia.

E d u c a t io n a l D e v e lo p m e n t

E d u c a t io n a l d e v e lo p m e n t can be d iv i d e d
W o rld W ar I I ,

p r e -In d e p e n d e n c e ,

in to

p r e -B r itis h ,

p re -

and p o s t-In d e p e n d e n c e .

P r e - B r i t i s h P e r io d

D u r in g t h i s

p e r io d th e e d u c a t io n a l s y s te m was n o n fo r m a l and

e m p h a s iz e d Q u ra n ic

te a c h in g s ,

good b e h a v io r ,

s y s te m a l s o p r o v id e d some r u d im e n ts

and m o r a l i t y .

T h is

i n h a n d i c r a f t s , and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
apprenticeships in agriculture,

fishing, and hunting.

At the more

formal level, there was the religious system of education known as
the "pondok" (hut) school established by the local "ulamak” (Islamic
scholar) (Education in Malaysia 1980, 1981,

p. 2).

The religious

school still exists in a more organized manner in contemporary
Malaysia.

Pre-World War II Period

This has had the most impact on the present system of education.
Undoubtedly the current system of education is basically similar to
the British kind of education.

The British introduced the system in

the 19th century for the Malay aristocracy.

Education in Malay was

provided by the British government at the elementary level.

In the

Malay Peninsular formal education in the Malay language began in 1821
at a branch school of the Penang Free School (Education in Malaysia
1980, 1981, p. 2).
orientations.
Company.

These early schools had strong religious Quranic

These Malay schools were assisted by the East India

Later they were completely taken over by the state govern

ment and the financial aid was provided for by the British govern
ment.

The objectives of education,

then, were to provide the basic

skills in reading, writing, and arithmetic.

Thus, the education

provided had a low social and economic value.
Chinese education had its root in Singapore in 1829 (Education
in Malaysia 1980, 1981,

p. 3).

The Chinese pupils in the Chinese-

medium schools were taught to read and write and to use the abacus.
The curriculum was China-oriented and textbooks and teachers were
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brought from China.

At this point, Chinese education in Malaya was

very much influenced by political development in China.

To overcome

this situation, the British government introduced laws in the 1920s
to control the activities of the schools.
The development of Tamil education was partly contributed to by
Christian missionary groups who established schools in areas with a
high Tamil population.

The education provided by the Tamil-medium

schools also had relatively low social and economic value in the
colonial state.

Most of the teachers in the Tamil schools were

recruited from India.
English education was first introduced in Malaya in 1816 (Educa
tion in Malaysia 1980,

1981, p. 3).

Christian missionaries also

helped in establishing English schools.

The first government English

school was built in Kuala Lumpur in 1890 (Education in Malaysia 1980,
p. 3).

Three English schools were established mainly for the urban

population.

Education in these schools was based on a general cur

riculum, with the aim of producing junior administrative officers to
support the British administration.

Pre-Independence Period

After the Japanese occupation, several committees such as the
Barnes Committee in 1950 and the Fenn-Wu Committee in 1951 were
established to cope with the social changes and to speed up the
process of achieving self-government.

As an outcome of these commit

tees, the Education Ordinance in 1952 was passed but did not, h o w 
ever, produce the desired changes.

Teacher training colleges were
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te m p o r a r ily

s e t up i n

te a c h e r t r a in in g
L u m p u r,

c o lle g e s

and J o h o re

In 1955,

E n g la n d t o

tr a in

w e r e a ls o

M a la y a n te a c h e r s .

e s ta b lis h e d

in

L o c a lly ,

P e n a n g , K u a la

B a h a ru .

the Woodhead Report urged the British government to

take over the responsibility of education for Sabah, and later
Sarawak.

Also, in 1960,

the McLellan report increased the awareness

of the Sarawak government of the necessity of having an integrated
education system (Education in Malaysia 1980, 1981,

p. 3).

P o s t -In d e p e n d e n c e P e r io d

In 1956,

the then Minister of Education, Dato' Abdul Razak

(later to become Tun Abdul Razak and Prime Minister of Malaysia)
produced the "Razak Report.”

His committee proposed a new national

educational policy with a view to ultimately make the Malay language
the National Language and medium of instruction while preserving and
sustaining the languages and cultures of the other social groups in
the Federation.

In 1960, a review committee was set up by Abdul

Rahman Tallb (Education in Malaysia 1980, 1981, p. 4).

The committee

suggested recommendations on the implementation of the new national
education policy.

The main recommendation of the Rahman Report later

became the Education Act of 1961.

The present education system is

the result of the implementation of this Act.
tions of the Rahman Report were:

The main recommenda

free primary education; automatic

promotion from Standard 1 (Grade 1) up to Form 3 (Grade 9);

assess

ment examination at primary level; enhancement of technical and
vocational education;

conversion from English to the Malay medium of
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instruction; and the expansion of the teacher training programs
(Education in Malaysia 1980, p. 4).

Various divisions and committees

were set-up to improve and implement effectively the Education Act of
1961.
The Cabinet Committee Report on Education was published in
December 1969 (Education in Malaysia 1980, 1981, p. 4).
mendations include:

The recom

removing unequal participation in education,

improving opportunities for higher educational attainment among
youths from disadvantaged groups, developing stronger moral and ethi
cal qualities of citizenship from school children, greater emphasis
on vocational orientation in education, and streamlining the profes
sional and administrative management of the educational system (Edu
cation in Malaysia 1980, p. 4).
This 1969 report on education signaled a major change in educa
tional emphasis.

Bahasa Malaysia replaced English and the Chinese

and Indian vernaculars in all schools and for most subjects at insti
tutions of higher learning.

Moreover Bumiputra (Malay and other

indigenous) pupils were given much easier access to the competitive
higher levels of education,
T h e e d u c a t io n a l s y s te m

such as university entrance.
c o n t in u e s

to s t r iv e

o f t h e n a t i o n a l d e v e lo p m e n t o b j e c t i v e s ,
ta tio n

of

th e New E c o n o m ic P o l i c y (N E P ).

t h e e d u c a t io n s y s te m i s
its

f o r th e a c h ie v e m e n t

e s p e c i a l l y w i t h th e im p le m e n 
The o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e

t o p ro m o te n a t i o n a l u n i t y w h i l e

p ro g ra m s t o m e e t t h e g r o w in g dem and f o r m a n p ow er.

of

o r ie n ta t in g
Thus e d u c a t io n

h as b e e n th e b ig g e s t s i n g l e m edium f o r th e im p le m e n t a t io n o f B ahasa
M a l a y s ia

as th e n a t i o n a l la n g u a g e .
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Language Policy:

Problems of Selection

The reasons for selecting Bahasa Malaysia as the national lan
guage were historical,

linguistic,

and political.

This historical basis for selecting Bahasa Malaysia stems from
the fact that it is a Malay derived language and that the Malays, as
the "definitive" ethnic group of the peninsular (Mohamad,

1970), are

the inheritors of a long historic tradition of Malay states in the
area.
The establishment of Malay as the official language was not a
sociological innovation.

It had been the language of the Sultanates

of the Malay peninsular and archipelago not only before the coming of
the British but also during the period of the British protectorate.
It was only with the establishment of a central colonial government
in Kuala Lumpur that English replaced Malay as the language of gov
ernment.

The Malay position at the time of Independence was that the

use of Malay as the national language represented a switch back from
English to Malay.

The only obstacle (which was later overcome) was

of course from the non-Malays who viewed the forced use of Malay as
both repressive and regressive.

Their opposition was used as a

pretext to question their loyalty to the new country.

The first

Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, remarked that those who wanted to make
Malaysia their home country should "make the grade."
"learn Malay."

They had to

Basically, what he meant was that the non-Malays

should make an effort to prove that they belonged locally.
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The linguistic basis for selecting Bahasa Malaysia as the
national language lay in the historic and modern position of Malay
(usually Bazaar/Pidgin Malay) as the lingua franca of the whole
region (Alisjahbana,

1971;

Hj. Omar,

1979).

Malay had been the lingua franca of the area for over a
millenium; the topography of Indonesia and Malaysia deter
mined the emergence of some 250 separate but related
languages, but the development of trade, political, and
cultural contacts evoked the necessity of a lingua franca.
The rise of Malay in this area seems a natural out
come of these variables. Geographically, Malay was
favored because it was used on both sides of the Straits
of Malacca.
Second, the fact that this area for centuries
had been the political center for Southeast Asia while
Srivijaya, Malacca, and Acheh were great centers of trade,
only accentuated the already favorable position of Malay
in this area. Third, it was the Malays who, from the
earliest timer seafarers, populated the coastal areas of
Sumatra, Borneo, and other islands.
Again, it has also
been suggested that the simplicity of the Malay language
when compared to the sociolinguistic complexities of the
Javanese language enhanced its use as a lingua franca.
Later colonizers (the Portuguese, the Dutch, the English,
and the Japanese) had to recognize that fact that Malay
was the only language that could be used to reach the
large majority, which, in turn served— though uninten
tionally— to help the spread of the Malay language.
Reli
gious missionaries (both Islamic and Christian) also had
to recognize this fact and helped as well in the spreading
of Malay.
Finally, it seems that Malay speakers are more
tolerant than most native speakers towards foreign "abuse"
of their language by non-native speakers.
(Alisjahbana,
1971, p. 180)
Some people in Malaysia argued the merits of maintaining and
promoting English as the prime medium of communication in secondary
and higher education, politics, and commerce (Lim, 1978).

Although

this was primarily rejected for political reasons (see below), the
greater linguistic accessibility of Bahasa Malaysia to the largest
section of the population was also a factor.
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The political reasons for selecting Bahasa Malaysia as the
national language were the most fundamental and overrode any others.
As has been explained in Chapter IV above,

the political structure of

Malaysia is dominated by aristocratic and bureaucratic Malay elites
who operate with the tacit agreement of representatives of Chinese
and Indian largely commercial and professional elites.

The ability

of the Malay elites to remain in power relies crucially on their
capacity to get support from the rural Malay masses.

The keynote to

maintaining this support lies in stressing Malay unity through in
ternal cohesion versus external threat.

The Malay language, along

with the Islamic religion, represent the most powerful media for
manipulating Malay nationalism across socioeconomic lines.
Members of the rural Malay masses rarely could speak any lan
guage other than Malay and therefore would not have tolerated a
government which excluded them from participation in the modern
educational, political, and economic sector by requiring them to use
a foreign language to gain access to it.

These rural masses consti

tuted the vast majority of UMNO's political support in elections and
thus could not be ignored.

They voted for a new breed of Malay

nationalist politicians who had to be co-opted by the existing UMNO
elite.

Dr. Mahathir and Musa,

the current Prime Minister and Deputy

Prime Minister, were both representative of the more extreme Malay
nationalist viewpoint in the 1960s.

After early ostracization,

were aftermath of the Ma y 1965 riots.
national language issue.

they

Both spoke out strongly on the

The UMNO political elite,

therefore, had to

select Bahasa Malaysia not only as the national language, but also as
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the prime language of education, government, and commerce.

The

problem lay in persuading the non-Malays to accept this policy and in
successfully implementing it.
UMNO became the leading component of the Alliance party because
of its key role in the independence movement.

It was made clear from

the start that Independent Malaya was to be the home of all Malayans
regardless of race and creed, on the condition that they honored the
constitution which made Malay the national language of the country.
The decision to make Malay the national language (and then the sole
official language, 10 years after Independence) was among the recom
mendations of the Reid Constitutional Commission set up in the name
of the Queen of England and the Rulers of the Malay States.
The Reid recommendations were in the interests of the Malay
population.

However,

the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce of

Malaya wanted the Malay, English, Chinese, and Tamil languages to be
on par with each other.

This was rejected by Tunku Abdul Rahman

(first Premier) who said,
The recommendation of the Commission with regard to the
use of the Chinese and Indian languages in either House of
Parliament of the Legislative Assembly or of a State has,
as you know, not been accepted. It would be most diffi
cult to operate the clause proposed by the Commission but
in any event it is very important that our people should
converse with one another in one common language and there
can be no doubt that that common language will ultimately
be the M a l a y language. (Hj. Omar, 1979, p. 6)
However, before and for some years after independence, debates
in the Federal Legislative ordinances were written in English lan
guage.

As such,

for the first Federal Election for self-governing

pre-independent Malaya which was held on October 16, 1954, to
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November 16, 1954, the then President of UMNO, Tunku Abdul Rahman
Putra, urged individual states to nominate people who could speak
English (Hj. Omar, 1979, p. 7).

The process of changing from English

to Bahasa Malaysia was very slow in the initial independence period
leading up to the riots of 1969.

Since then the Malay elite has

dramatically speeded up the process as part of the overall-policy
accompanying the implementation of the NEP.
In the granting of citizenship to the immigrant population, a
language requirement was among those that had to be fulfilled.

It

was stipulated that an applicant for citizenship had to have an
elementary knowledge of Malay (Hj. Omar,
tion was determined by a language test.

1979, p. 7).

The stipula

Resistance to this language

requirement came from the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce of
Malaya, which besides calling for a reduction of the qualifying
period of residence from 10 years to 5 for citizenship by applica
tion, also urged the abolition of the language test.

However,

their

resistance was unsuccessful.

The Implementation of Bahasa Malaysia
and Its Problems

Malaysia's monolingual policy has been under fire from those who
believe in multilingualism and bilingualism.

However, for the rea

sons proposed above, Bahasa Malaysia became the only possible con
tender in a winner-take-all race.

Article 152 of the Constitution of

Federation of Malaya states that, "the national language shall be a
Malay language" (Hj. Otrai, 1979, p. 28).

Thus Bahasa Malaysia
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gradually replaced English and the immigrant languages.

The pattern

was for Bahasa Malaysia to gradually replace Chinese and Tamil among
lower socioeconomic strata of non-Malays while it replaced English
among the non-Malay elites.

English remains the language of law and

of much higher education in science and technology.

The immigrant

languages are protected as vernaculars in the primary school system,
where the Pupils' Own Language (POL) scheme allows the teaching of
the vernacular where 15 or more pupils request it.
The national language issue became important in the discussions
involving the pre-Independence Constitution agreement concerning the
barriers between the ethnic groups.

It became a communal issue and

was exploited for vote catching in general elections.

In 1967 the

National Language Act made Bahasa Malaysia the sole official language
of the coun t r y (Hj. Omar, 1979, p. 28).

This w a s one of the factors

which led to the bloody ethnic riots after the general election of
1969.

After these riots, the government enacted a law which forbade

any person or political party to question the status of Bahasa
Malaysia as the only national and official language of Malaysia.
things happened with the adoption of the language.

Firstly,

Two

the

burden of development was placed on the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka
(Malaysia's language planning agency).
In 1959 the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka acquired the status of a
corporation under the Ministry of Education (Hj. Omar,

1976, p. 42).

Its tasks were:
1.

To develop and enrich the national language.
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2.

To promote literary talents, especially in the national

language.
3.

To print or publish or assist the printing or publication of

books, magazines, pamphlets, and other forms of literature in the
national language as well as in the other languages.
4.

To compile and publish a national dictionary.

The Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka had published by the end of 1966 a
total of 475 titles; most are books for the primary and secondary
schools and general reading materials for a wider public
(Alisjahbana, 1971, p. 30).
Important also is the coining of a modern Malay terminology.

At

the beginning of 1967 about 70,000 terms had been coined in the Malay
language in connection with government, agriculture, engineering,
economics, commerce, telecommunication, linguistics, medicine, etc.
(Alisjahbana, 1971, p. 36).
A comprehensive dictionary of the Malay language was published
in 1970 (Alisjahbana, 1971, p. 40).
The Dewan is also the center for the National Language Campaign,
to encourage people to use the national language in their daily
lives.
The second development was the gradual implementation of the
language for official communication and instruction in institutions
of learning.

Knowing that the split between the Malays and the non-

Malays was a problem, the Ministry of Education announced that
English-medium schools would switch to Bahasa Malaysia in 1970 (Hj.
Omar & Mohd. Noor,

1981, p. 28).

The full conversion from the lowest
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level of education to the highest level of education was to be com
pleted by 1983 (Hj. Omar & Mohd. Noor,

p. 28).

Research was later

conducted and it was found that the Malays were under-achieving in
education.

Because of the under-achievement, the government started

to give aid to the Malays, and especially to those in the rural
areas.

This aid was in terms of books,

school uniforms, and shoes.

A number of international justifications and explanations for
the national language policy have emerged.

Firstly, Malay is not

only used by Malaysia but also by Indonesia.

The use of a Malay

national language in Indonesia greatly motivated Malay intellectuals
to adopt it as a national and official language.

As such,

the lan

guage is a means of political integration for both Malaysians and
Indonesians.

Imitating the Indonesians’ nomenclature,

language was named Bahasa Malaysia.

the Malay

Despite some lingering post

confrontation fears of the giant big brother to the south, Malaysia
has growing political, economic, and cultural, especially linguistic,
ties with Indonesia.
Secondly, the use of Bahasa Malaysia was justified as a means of
asserting national identity.
communist,

It showed that while Malaysia was anti

it was not totally In the pocket of the West.

National

language is thus seen as the entity of sounds and symbols which are
the primary vehicle of thought of a specific nation.

A newly inde

pendent nation in many respects needs a new attitude, different from,
or contrary to, the traditional attitude.

The models available to

base this new attitude on are commonly taken to be communism,
westernization, or nationalism.

The Malaysian elites naturally
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reject communism.

However, they do not want to adopt western

cultural values and norms although they are most willing to adopt
western technology and the West's capitalist economic system.

Standardizing and Improving the Status
of Bahasa Malaysia

There have been a number of linguistic problems in implementing
the national language policy.

These will be discussed briefly.

The biggest issue for the linguists responsible for standardiz
ing the national language was on which dialect of Malay they were to
base the "new" national language.

Johore Malay was chosen because of

its widespread and its perceived higher status.
In planning for a writing system the process .requires selection
and Implementation.

Originally the Malay language (Bahasa Malaysia)

was written under an assortment of spelling systems in Roman script.
The first systems of spelling was the Wilkinson System (Hj.
Omar, 1979, p. 70).

During the Japanese occupation the "Ejaan Fajar

Asia” (the Spelling System of Dawn of Asia) was adopted (Hj. Omar,
p. 70).

In 1946,

the "Ejaan Congress" System of Spelling was devel

oped (Hj. Omar, p. 70).

After Independence the Malindo System was

produced but was never implemented (Hj. Omar, p. 70).

The Malaysia-

Indcnesia System of 1967 was agreed upon but was never made public
(Hj. Omar, p. 71).

Finally,

this confusion was brought to an end

when the "Sistem Ejaan University of Malaya 1971" (University of
Malaya Spelling System 1971) was adopted (Hj. Omar, p. 71).

Finally,

on August 16, 1972, the standard system for both Malaysia and
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Indonesia was declared official simultaneously in Jakarta (the
capital of Indonesia) and Kuala Lumpur (the capital of Malaysia) (Hj.
Omar, p. 71).
Another problem was the need for a Malaysian-Indonesian
standardization of technical terms.

The party standing to gain most

from common spelling was Malaysia, but nevertheless Indonesia seemed
to believe that in the long run it would be advantageous to the
development of Indonesia as well.

The spelling agreement of 1972 was

the first step towards cooperation in the fields of language and
culture.

The follow-up was the collaboration to produce standardiza

tion of technical terms.
Apart from standardizing the Malay language in Malaysia and
Indonesia, much consideration had to be made for improving the status
of the language.

In the last 20 years the language has moved from

being a simple language restricted in use to become a language of
wider communication.

It is used to replace English not only in the

classroom and government offices, but as the language of public
communication such as in road signs and cinema subtitles.

Notices

and signs in other languages were translated into the Malay language.
In the process,

problems occurred.

Translations were done by people who were ignorant of the struc
tural differences between languages and some extraordinary results
emerged.

The effect of this was to promote confusion for language

learners.
Language corpus planning for Bahasa Malaysia has now reached a
high standard.

The Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka continues its publishing
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and translation works finding or creating Malay roots for terminology
from other languages.

Evaluating Malaysia's National Language Policy

This final section attempts to evaluate the success and failure
of Malaysia's national language policy in promoting national integra
tion over ethno-cultural division.

Once it is accepted that the

driving force behind the national language policy is the maintenance
of Malay political unity, the use of Bahasa Malaysia becomes evident.
The continuing dominance of the westernized and cosmopolitan Malay
elite, however, has enabled the non-Malay elites to identify with and
accept the culturally pluralist political system.

On the other hand,

the political integration of the Malay elite with the Malay peasantry
has enabled them to close the communication gap between non-Malays
and the Malay majority.

These policies and efforts create the condi

tions necessary for building and expanding national community.
The basis for evaluation has been to compare the degree of
national integration existing in the period between Independence
(1957) and the ethnic rioting of 1969 and the period following the
implementation of the NEP (1971 to the present).
Although on the surface there appears to be continuity in the
policies throughout the whole post-Independence period, closer in
spection reveals a much more serious commitment to implementing the
national language policy since 1969.

Indeed the whole post-1969

political structure is different from that of the first 12 years
after Independence.

Whereas the Malay ruling elite was largely of
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aristocratic origin in the British educated tradition prior to 1969,
it has come increasingly to consist of products of the new Malay
bureaucracy since 1969.

The roles of the non-Malay elites in the

political process have been limited and the right to criticize the
government has been severly curtailed.

Von Vorys (1975) explained

the post 1969 political setup:
the Directorate would continue to implement the constitu
tional contract. There was still room for bargaining and
for a "give and take.” But the final decision on cultural
integration, the appropriate marginal rates of growth in
the Malay access to the economy and Chinese access to
government would not be resolved by a compromise among
more or less equal parties.
They would be decided by what
the top UMNO leaders considered fair and in the interest
of Malaysia. It was, of course, a very much simpler
system,
(p. 344)
The evaluation of the effect of language policy on the relative
degrees of ethno-cultural integration pre- and post-1969 must con
sider the extent to which Bahasa Malaysia was used in Malaysia before
and after that date.
In education Bahasa Malaysia had become the medium of instruc
tion at all levels in most schools in West Malaysia by 1983.

In 1968

only about one-third of the total number of students in schools in
West Malaysia were educated in Malay.

The ability of students to

pass the Form 3 proficiency examinations in Bahasa Malaysia rose by
over 2Pr'% between 1968 and 1982 (Malaysia Economic Report, 1983,
p. 17).

The implementation of the national language policy in educa

tion has also ensured that all secondary schools are ethnically inte
grated.

Prior to the implementation of the policy many children

attended secondary schools which excluded members of different ethnic
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groups because of the language of the medium of instruction.
By the mid-1970s all material emanating from and going between
government departments except the legislatures and the Law Courts was
in Bahasa Malaysia.

(The exceptions produced material in both Bahasa

Malaysia and English.)

Whereas non-Malay politicians and others

making official speeches tended to use English or the Chinese or
Indian vernaculars prior to 1969; all speeches now at least begin and
end in Bahasa Malaysia.

Government information, signs, and adver

tisements are now all in Bahasa Malaysia.

All government forms,

including those pertaining to taxes and licenses, are n o w in Bahasa
Malaysia only, instead of in English and the non-Malay vernaculars.
In the private commercial sector the effect of the national
language policy has also been felt.

Companies need to communicate

with the government, and increasingly with other Malaysian private
business concerns,

in Bahasa Malaysia.

They are also required to

have 30% 3umiputras on their payrolls which increases the need for
using Bahasa Malaysia as an integrating lingua franca (Malaysia
Economic Report, 1983,

p. 32).

Advertising too has to be increas

ingly conducted in Bahasa Malaysia.

Moreover, since almost all young

Malaysians under 21 years old have been educated exclusively in
Bahasa Malaysia, a large and growing part of the work force communi
cates only in the national language when not involved in dialogue
with a speaker of the same vernacular.
The media too has witnessed an enormous increase in the use of
Bahasa Malaysia.

The number of hours of broadcasts on television and

radio in Bahasa Malaysia increased by 60% between 1964 and 1972,
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while the number of hours in English, Chinese, and Tamil increased by
only 10%, 15%, and 40%, respectively, over the same period (Malaysia
Economic Report, 1983, p. 27).

Although more recent figures are

unavailable, the results would certainly be much more indicative of
the increased exposure to and use of Bahasa Malaysia.
Bahasa Malaysia newspaper circulation figures too have increased
at a much faster rate than other language editions.

The circulation

of Bahasa Malaysia daily newspapers rose from 110,000 in 1969 to
830,000 in 1979!

The comparative figures for English dailies were

from 272,000 to 636,000;

for Chinese from 148,000 to 222,000;

Tamil from 19,000 to 17,000 (Henderson,
nomic Report, 1983, p. 30).

and for

1970, p. 38; Malaysia Eco

Since newspaper circulation figures are

outside the control of the government, they provided the most compel
ling proof of a massive voluntary shift to using Bahasa Malaysia.
However, the strongest evidence for greater ethno-cultural inte
gration in Malaysia post-1969 is the simple fact that there has not
been a repeat of the ethnic rioting that occurred in that year since
then.

Another possible indicator of greater inter-ethnic integration

has been a decline in the number of votes cast for more ethnically
polarized parties.
In the elections since 1969 the number of seats won by UMNO and
its fellow National Front parties and votes cast by Malays for UMNO
have increased, while the number of seats and Malay votes for other
parties have decreased.
In the 1978 elections the National Front won 131 out of 154
seats in the Federal parliament and the leading Malay opposition
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party, Party Islam (PAS) was crushed,

winning only 5 seats.

PAS even

lost the control of Kelantan, its stronghold since independence in
the state elections (FEER Asia Yearbook, 1979, p. 238).

The 1982

elections further increased the overwhelming dominance of the UMNO
and gave the National Front 140 seats.

The opposition parties were

transformed into weak minorities winning only 14 seats (FEER Asia
Y e a r b o o k , 1983, p. 193).
In summary,

while it is beyond the scope of this study to mea

sure the impact of other factors in promoting national integration in
Malaysia, it is reasonable to conclude that the increased use of
Bahasa Malaysia has contributed to both inter-Malay political inte
gration and inter-ethnic social and economic integration in Malaysia.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated

he role of a national language

policy in promoting political integration in a new nation:

Malaysia.

A thorough theoretical investigation of the political uses of
language showed the advantages of adopting a single linguistic code
for fostering national development through political, economic, and
ethno-cultural integration.

An examination of the origins of

Malaysia's ethno-cultural diversity revealed the socioeconomic bases
to the cleavages.

The nature of Malaysian politics as seen against

the socioeconomic and ethno-cultural backdrop was given as the com
plex set-off reasons for the selection of Bahasa Malaysia as the sole
national and official language of the country.

The processes and

problems of implementation were reviewed before finally evaluating
the practical effects of the language policy on Malaysia.
While one may conclude that Bahasa Malaysia is a necessary
ingredient and the logical choice among languages for Malaysia, it
would be wrong to view the implementation of the national language
policy as devoid of less altruistic intent.

It must also be seen as

one of the political moves on the part of the Malay ruling elite to
satisfy the demands of the Malay masses and thus keep the Malays as
an ethno-cultural entity unified politically.

Whether the success of

this and related ethno-cultural policies (such as increasing
Islamization) will continue to hold the Malays together is debatable,

84
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especially in the light of growing evidence that the huge socio
economic differences between Malay elites and masses are challenging
Malay political unity.
The Malay elites' ability to remain in power (largely by secur
ing the continued grass roots support of the Malay peasantry without
alienating the non-Malay elites) has enabled Malaysia to remain
unified across socioeconomic and ethno-cultural lines.

Moreover, by

maintaining a semblance of democracy, more than any other Southeast
Asian nation,

it has sustained economic growth.

Social stability,

economic success, and relative political unity, as well as Malaysian
democracy are dependent on an elitist political system.

That system

must increasingly manipulate such cultural symbols as language and
religion in order to maintain Malay mass support, while progress
towards equity in the peasant economic sector must be made.
Non-Malay, Chinese and Indian elites are aware of the volatility
of the Malay voters and of the Malay peasantry's poverty,

increasing

religious fundamentalism, and growing disenchantment with their
rulers.

Therefore,

they are willing to support the Malay elites'

language policy, even at the cost of living in a more Malay and less
Malaysian Malaysia.
Whereas language dominated the cultural dimensions of Malaysian
politics in most of the period under review in this thesis, religion
has recently become more prominent.

The Malay peasantry have always

placed their faith foremost with their God and secondly in the lead
ers of their race.

However, growing numbers of the Malay masses seem

inclined to be mobilized in the name of the former against the real
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and imagined neglect received at the hands of the latter.

This is

evidenced not so much by political support for opposition Islamic
parties, but rather through support for officially nonpolitical
Islamic organizations, such as the powerful Islamic Youth Movement
ABIM), and by changing UMNO from within.

The marked fundamentalist

radlcalization.of UMNO's grass roots activists is evident in the
virtual absence of uncovered wom e n party workers now, whereas it was
rare to find an UMNO wom a n political activist who covered her head 10
years ago.
The increased surface Islamization of Malaysia, as depicted by
the government dress codes, restrictions on gambling for Muslims,

and

the opening of an Islamic University and an Islamic bank described in
Chapters IV and V, has been compounded by the co-optation of funda
mentalist leaders.

Anwar Ibrahim is the most notable of the young

Islamic intelligentsia to be brought into the UMNO elite camp.

He

has enjoyed a meteoric and unprecedented rise to power within UMNO
since 1982, and now ranks as third in the UMNO leadership after the
Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Musa.
Such political astuteness on behalf of the UMNO elite Malay leader
ship has brought in a great number of potential opposition Malays to
the party.
leaders,

This practice resembles the way that Malay nationalist

such as Mahathir himself, were brought into UMNO on the

national language issue in the 1960s.
The role that the national language policy occupied in the 1960s
and 1970s in uniting the Malays now appears to have been superseded
by religion in the wake of Islamic revivalism.

Whatever the outcome
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of the Malaysia's divisions— religious,

ethnic,

or socioeconomic— the

national language issue should not feature prominently again.

The

Malay elite has so successfully used and implanted the use of Bahasa
Malaysia among the country's diverse population that it is likely to
remain the dominant language.

Bahasa Malaysia's Impact as a force

for political unity and stability, and the acceptance of its perma
nence by most Malaysians, have served to institutionalize this once
contentious language.
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